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Andrew Verstein† 
Because legal determinations often turn on motive, and motives are often 
complex, courts must decide what to do about mixed motives. For example, a boss 
might fire someone both for lawful reasons relating to job performance and also 
because of illegal prejudice. Increasingly, courts evaluate such cases under a “But-
For standard,” which finds for the plaintiff only if the defendant would have acted 
differently but for the bad motive. Put another way, the defendant loses unless the 
bad motive made some kind of causal difference in outcomes. While this approach 
is intuitive, I argue that the But-For standard is problematic. The widespread ac-
ceptance of the But-For standard is the most important failure in our jurispru-
dence of mixed motives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How should we judge people who act for both good and bad 
motives? For example, in 1971, an Ohio school district fired Fred 
Doyle from his job as a public school teacher. The district had 
some good reasons: Doyle fought with coworkers and made ob-
scene gestures at students.1 However, the district also admitted 
to retaliating against Doyle for talking to the media about mat-
ters of public importance.2 Given the school district’s mixed mo-
tives, did it break the law in firing Doyle? 
In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v 
Doyle,3 the Supreme Court’s answer was this: judge people by 
their good motives if their good motives would have been 
enough; judge people by their bad motives only if they would 
have acted differently but for the bad motives. Mt. Healthy 
therefore announced a “But-For standard” for mixed motives.4 
Given the complexity of human nature, courts must often 
evaluate mixed-motives cases,5 and Mt. Healthy’s But-For stand-
ard has proven distinctly influential. Eight-thousand five-hundred 
 
 1 Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v Doyle, 429 US 274, 281–82 
(1977). Doyle’s suit was filed under 42 USC § 1983, which authorizes individuals to sue 
for damages or injunctive relief in response to violations of their constitutional rights. 
Note that the obscene gesture would probably not upset contemporary sensibilities. See 
Brief for Respondent Fred Doyle, Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v 
Doyle, No 75-1278, *7 (US filed Aug 2, 1976) (available on Westlaw at 1976 WL 181614) 
(Doyle Brief) (stating that the meaning of Doyle’s gesture depended on geography: in 
Texas, it would be recognized as the “Hook ’em Horns” gesture associated with the 
University of Texas athletics program; in Ohio, it had a “somewhat different connotation 
also related to bulls”). 
 2 Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 282–83 (noting that, in its decision to not rehire Doyle, 
the school district mentioned that Doyle discussed the school’s proposed dress code with 
a radio personality). 
 3 429 US 274 (1977). 
 4 Id at 287 (holding that the school district is not liable if it can prove “that it 
would have reached the same decision as to [Doyle’s] reemployment even in the absence 
of the protected conduct”). 
 5 As of October 12, 2018, searching Westlaw for federal opinions containing the 
words “mixed motive(s)” returns over ten thousand cases, and the Supreme Court de-
cides a mixed-motives case essentially every other year. 
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federal court opinions, including sixty-five Supreme Court opin-
ions, cite Mt. Healthy.6 Its But-For standard is used to evaluate 
mixed motives in numerous areas of the law, such as employ-
ment and labor law;7 securities market manipulation claims;8 
landlord-tenant disputes;9 Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection claims, such as those demanding racially integrated 
juries;10 and First Amendment suits demanding viewpoint neu-
trality11 or government workers’ expressive rights.12 So great is 
its influence that many courts conflate this particular standard 
with the broader category of standards of which it is a member: 
a mixed-motive analysis just is a but-for analysis.13 
The But-For standard is also the one that scholars invoke, 
almost instinctually, in law reform projects.14 With limited 
 
 6 Almost five thousand cases (including eighteen Supreme Court opinions) cite the 
Westlaw headnote that links to this test. 
 7 See, for example, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v Nassar, 570 
US 338, 343 (2013); Gross v FBL Financial Services, Inc, 557 US 167, 180 (2009). 
 8 See, for example, Securities and Exchange Commission v Masri, 523 F Supp 2d 
361, 372 (SDNY 2007). 
 9 See, for example, Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 186, §§ 17–18. 
 10 See, for example, Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 240 (1989): 
In determining whether a particular factor was a but-for cause of a given 
event, we begin by assuming that that factor was present at the time of the 
event, and then ask whether, even if that factor had been absent, the event 
nevertheless would have transpired in the same way. 
 11 See, for example, Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District 
No 26 v Pico, 457 US 853, 871 n 22 (1982) (“By ‘decisive factor’ we mean a ‘substantial 
factor’ in the absence of which the opposite decision would have been reached.”), citing 
Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 287. 
 12 See, for example, Hartman v Moore, 547 US 250, 260 (2006) (applying the But-
For standard to retaliatory prosecution against a lobbyist); Givhan v Western Line 
Consolidated School District, 439 US 410, 417 (1979) (remanding to determine whether 
the petitioner’s exercise of First Amendment rights was a but-for cause of the school dis-
trict’s failure to rehire her rather than “the ‘primary’” reason). 
 13 See, for example, State v Ornelas, 330 P3d 1085, 1092–93 (Idaho App 2014) (re-
ferring to the But-For test, with burden shifting, as the “mixed-motives analysis” as con-
trasted to other approaches to mixed-motives jury strikes); Ndonyi v Mukasey, 541 F3d 
702, 710–11 (7th Cir 2008) (criticizing the Board of Immigration Appeals in an asylum 
case because it “completely ignored the doctrine of mixed motives—the opinion does not 
analyze whether Ndonyi’s oppressors were partially motivated by politics or religion”). 
 14 Scholars have urged its adoption in numerous fields. See, for example, Daniel J. 
Hemel and Eric A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 Cal L Rev 1277, 1319 
(2018). These endorsements come often, sometimes without considering alternatives. 
See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some 
Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 S Ct Rev 1, 32 
n 77 (assuming without argument the applicability of a “But-For” test). And sometimes 
after considering alternatives. See, for example, Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An 
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 S Ct Rev 95, 119 
(rejecting the “‘sole or dominant’ motivation” standard in favor of asking whether illicit 
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exceptions,15 the But-For standard has been widely praised or 
recommended.16 
It is understandable why the But-For standard might seem 
attractive. Such a standard prevents overcompensation of plain-
tiffs who would have suffered anyway because the standard ig-
nores bad motives that made no difference to anyone’s conduct; 
no harm, no foul. The But-For standard also prevents liability 
for mere stray thoughts and limits intrusive judicial second-
guessing. Humans are fallible, and the law must make some al-
lowance for our impure thoughts, so long as they are causally 
inert. If Fred Doyle was a danger to his colleagues and students, 
the But-For standard lets the school district get him out of the 
classroom. 
Despite the superficial plausibility of such justifications, 
this Article argues that the But-For standard does not deserve 
its laurels. To the contrary, widespread acceptance of the But-
For standard represents a great failure of the jurisprudence of 
mixed motives. 
Part of my case is a matter of intellectual history. The most 
familiar arguments for the But-For standard are of such recent 
and disreputable provenance that they do not deserve the defer-
ence that comes with long use.17 Another part of my case is to 
point out how the But-For standard has normatively unattrac-
tive implications: it does not guide courts with difficult decisions 
and allows them to conceal their real reasoning.18 It also silences 
important voices, preventing the airing of important grievances, 
 
motive “determined the outcome of the decision”), quoting Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 
217, 224–25 (1971). See also Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan L 
Rev 767, 777 (2001) (“Because a content-based regulation makes communication itself an 
element of the prohibited act, the communication effected by the act must be a but-for 
cause of whatever wrong or harm the regulation is supposed to prevent.”). 
 15 The But-For standard has met stiff resistance from employment law scholars. 
See, for example, Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making 
Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 Georgetown L J 489, 515–27 (2006). 
Other seeming critics actually endorse the But-For standard, subject to modification. For 
example, Professor Mark Brodin would retain a But-For test at least in Title VII cases 
seeking a reinstatement and back pay but would simply place the burden of proof on the 
defendant. See Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII 
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 Colum L Rev 292, 323–24 (1982). This is not a re-
jection of the But-For standard so much as it is a request to accommodate the But-For 
standard. 
 16 See, for example, Anjum Gupta, The New Nexus, 85 U Colo L Rev 377, 457 (2014) 
(proposing a But-For standard in asylum claims). 
 17 See Parts II.A.1, IV.A.2. 
 18 See Part V.A. 
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because the operation of a But-For standard ends up focusing 
much more on the exculpatory good motives than the inculpatory 
bad ones.19 
Yet the main problem with the But-For standard, and the 
main thrust of this Article, is that the But-For standard does not 
actually serve the goals its proponents care about. It seems to 
prevent windfalls when in fact all it does is allocate windfalls.20 
Relatedly, the But-For standard seems to protect individuals 
from excessive judicial meddling, but other mixed-motives 
standards make far better safe harbors.21 A judge interested in 
reducing windfalls or intrusion should instead select an alterna-
tive motive rule. 
With no strong policy argument to support the But-For 
standard, what remains is a bare concern for causation. The in-
tuition is that, if a given motive is not a but-for cause of an ac-
tion, then the motive cannot matter. This reasoning simply mis-
understands black letter tort law on causation. In cases of 
multiple sufficient causation (like two raging fires converging on 
the same cabin), the law regards several factors as causes even 
though no one is a but-for cause.22 Any analysis that likens mo-
tives to causes would not limit itself to a But-For standard, if only 
because tort law does not limit itself to but-for causes.23 
More fundamentally, arguments from causation often in-
volve a mistaken inference: if causation is important, then 
motive-causation is important. Yet a commitment to imposing 
liability only when a defendant caused a plaintiff’s injury does 
not entail that every aspect of the defendant’s action must have 
played a causal role. Batterers are liable for battery if they 
cause nonconsensual injury, but lack of consent need not have 
made any causal contribution. As a whole, actions with motive 
as an element may need to cause injury, but we rarely see ar-
guments for why motives must be held to causal standards. 
Given the problems with the But-For standard, why has it 
proven so influential? Bad standards persist, and bad argu-
ments go unexamined, when people are not aware that there are 
alternatives. Previous research in this area was premised on the 
 
 19 See Part V.B. 
 20 See Part IV.B. 
 21 See Part III. 
 22 See, for example, Kingston v Chicago & Northwest Railway, 211 NW 913, 
915 (Wis 1927). 
 23 See Part II.B. 
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idea that material advances in our motives jurisprudence would 
be possible once we learned how to talk and think clearly about 
motives.24 This Article is the first normative application of that 
agenda, identifying an important judicial standard and then 
testing it against alternatives and objections. 
This Article is structured in five Parts. Part I introduces the 
But-For standard and mixed-motives analysis generally. It pro-
vides a vocabulary for describing mixed motives and a way to 
think about them. That Part is an applied summary of previous 
scholarship, so those readers familiar with the recent literature 
can pass swiftly through it. Nevertheless, the goal of Part I is 
not just preparation. Rather, learning how to talk and think 
about motive standards is itself a tacit attack on the primacy of 
the But-For standard; noticing that the law has many options 
for motive standards loosens hold of the But-For standard as es-
sential to any particular area of law. If there are many options, 
one must ask what justifies any given option. 
The next three Parts examine candidate justifications. 
Part II considers whether the But-For standard comports espe-
cially well with the demands of causation analysis. I argue that 
proper causation analysis of motive would permit far more suits 
than does the But-For standard. The only interesting question is 
whether we should care about causation at all. I trace the ori-
gins of motive-causation analysis in the law and argue that con-
cern for causation is best understood as a proxy for other policy 
concerns, which can be better addressed directly (as the next 
two Parts actually do). 
Part III addresses arguments concerned with defendants’ 
freedom of action. For example, a stringent motive test could 
grind the government to a halt whenever bigoted officials are 
elected; a But-For standard permits actions vital to national se-
curity even if the official happens to entertain unconstitutionally 
bigoted motives for the action. Yet this argument trades on two 
errors. First, it ignores alternative motive rules that provide 
even better assurance to defendants (without necessarily com-
promising the interests of plaintiffs). Second, it conflates liabil-
ity and remedy questions. It is often possible to permit the de-
fendant’s action while still recognizing the injury to its victim. 
 
 24 See, for example, Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 
Yale L J 1106, 1112–13 (2018). 
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Part IV considers the interests of plaintiffs. A liberal motive 
standard might allow overcompensation, for example, by allow-
ing incompetent employees to be reinstated because of the boss’s 
stray thoughts. While a But-For standard can prevent a plain-
tiff’s windfall, it goes too far and imparts a windfall on defend-
ants. Part IV considers other motive standards that minimize, 
rather than allocate, any windfall. 
While the bulk of this Article criticizes the But-For standard 
indirectly as resting on a troubled foundation, Part V criticizes it 
directly as lacking properties that are plainly desirable in a 
mixed-motive rule. Holding the But-For standard to a series of 
intuitive requirements both shows its inadequacy and suggests 
the sorts of requirements that a proper motive approach must 
meet. Part V is therefore the foundation of a general normative 
theory of motives and serves to preview developments forthcom-
ing in later research. 
It remains possible that the But-For standard is justified in 
some cases. Perhaps there are areas of law for which all alterna-
tive standards are problematic or impossible. A final verdict on 
the But-For standard would require a deep dive into each area 
of application, a comprehensive normative framework for motive 
analysis, and a head-to-head comparison of the But-For stand-
ard against its most promising competitor—too much for one ar-
ticle.25 For now, I merely argue that, for any area of law, courts 
and lawmakers should take seriously the possibility that a But-
For standard is not an appropriate way to address mixed-
motives claims. In making my case, I cleave most closely to the 
law of employment discrimination because it is the area with the 
most development and influence on mixed-motives jurispru-
dence in recent years.26 
 
 25 This Article does not address whether motive analysis, rather than some entirely 
objective test, is appropriate in a given domain. I take the law as it is, which sometimes 
involves motive analysis. Nor does my criticism of the But-For standard culminate in a 
clear, issue-by-issue endorsement of an alternative test. That task would require intro-
ducing and defending a whole normative jurisprudence of mixed motives, which is the 
task for the next normative paper to follow this one. For now, I often hold up other mo-
tive standards as alternatives to show that substituting another motive standard would 
often lead to better results than the But-For standard. This is both to show problems 
with the But-For standard and to stoke the imagination: if we see that it is easy to list 
alternatives that outshine the But-For standard, we may become receptive to yet other 
possibilities. 
 26 See, for example, Nassar, 570 US at 343; Gross, 557 US at 179. 
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I.  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BUT-FOR STANDARD 
What is a But-For standard in a mixed-motives case? How 
would we know if it has been satisfied? How does it differ from 
other approaches to motive analysis? 
One way to describe it is with words, precisely defining the 
content of this standard. The Uniformed Services Employment 
and Reemployment Rights Act27 uses a But-For standard to 
evaluate workplace discrimination against veterans. It bars ad-
verse treatment “on the basis of” their military service.28 It then 
goes on to say that such actions violate the law “unless the em-
ployer can prove that the action would have been taken in the 
absence of” the protected status.29 The statute defines a motive-
based offense and then provides a safe harbor in the shape of the 
But-For standard. 
In other areas, such as federal regulation of securities mar-
ket manipulation, the governing statute is silent on motive 
standards, so it must be found in case law: “The Court holds 
that in order to impose liability for an open market transaction, 
the SEC must prove that but for the manipulative intent, the de-
fendant would not have conducted the transaction.”30 That rule 
emerges from a case in which a defendant bought a terrific 
quantity of stock at the end of a trading day both as a prudent 
hedge for some maturing liabilities and to eliminate those liabil-
ities by monkeying with the stock price on which the liabilities 
were based.31 
These different formulations—a statutory protection for 
veterans, a common law standard for traders—use different 
 
 27 Pub L No 103-353, 108 Stat 3149 (1994), codified as amended at 38 USC 
§ 4301 et seq. 
 28 38 USC § 4311(a). Its scope is actually wider than just prior military service, 
covering also current and future military service. 
 29 38 USC § 4311(c)(1). 
 30 Securities and Exchange Commission v Masri, 523 F Supp 2d 361, 372 
(SDNY 2007). 
 31 In Masri, a trader bought two hundred thousand shares of a Mexican television 
station in the last minutes of the trading day, which represented the great majority of 
the day’s purchase. Id at 362–65. The trader had a clear financial reason to spike the 
market price: he was contractually committed to buy 860,000 shares at $5 if the price 
finished below that point that day. By pushing the price up, he averted an overpayment 
loss of more than $100,000. On the other hand, the trader also had nonmanipulative rea-
sons to buy the stock: he had a looming obligation to deliver half a million shares a few 
months hence, and he deemed the present price low enough to warrant early action. So 
here we have a case in which two different agendas might suggest the same conduct: buy 
as much as you can carry. 
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words. They may differ in other important ways, too, such as 
who has the burden of proving or disproving a motive that meets 
the But-For standard. For discrimination against veterans, the 
defendant bears the final burden of showing that bad motive 
was not a but-for factor in the decision; for market manipula-
tion, the government bears the burden of showing that it was a 
but-for factor. Still, both tests share the notion that the defend-
ant can prevail if the lawful motive would have independently 
motivated the act such that the illicit motive appears to be su-
perfluous to the outcome. 
Another way to think about mixed motives is numerically, 
assigning values to represent the relative importance or intensity 
of various motives, which can then be depicted graphically. We 
could talk about some sort of motivational “strength,” the mag-
nitude of which can be given a number. When there are just two 
motives, we can graph the pairing as Cartesian coordinates. A 
previous article offered a way of describing motives and motive 
standards, which I restate briefly here.32 
Consider four individuals (bosses) who each take an equiva-
lent given action (say, firing employee). For each boss, A-Motive 
denotes her acceptable reasons for the action, such as the fact 
that employee is a very poor worker, and B-Motive denotes un-
acceptable motives for the firing, such as antidisability animus. 
Figure 1 depicts the motive combinations attributable to each 
individual: Alpha (A: 1.3, B: 0.7), Beta (A: 0.3, B: 1.5), Delta 
(A: 0.4, B: 0.9), and Gamma (A: 1.4, B: 1.6). 
 
 32 See generally Verstein, 127 Yale L J 1106 (cited in note 24). 
734 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:725 
 
FIGURE 1:  GRAPHING MOTIVES 
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This graphical placement makes it easy to quickly see indi-
viduals’ motive combinations. Alpha fired the employee with 
mixed motives, but her acceptable motives were strong. Indeed, 
they were so strong (A > 1), that they would have independently 
motivated her to action. Conversely, her bad motives, if they 
were isolated from any other motives, would not have actually 
led Alpha to fire the employee. The animus would have lingered 
without expression, and the employee would have kept her job. 
Beta has the opposite sort of pairing. She acted for mixed 
motives too, but her acceptable motives were quite weak and 
would not have amounted to a firing on their own. Conversely, 
her bad or B-Motives needed no help to spur her to action. She 
would have fired the employee for animus alone. 
Delta has mixed motives, neither of which are compelling, 
but which are collectively sufficient to spur action. If either mo-
tive were weakened or eliminated, she would not have acted. 
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And Gamma has two very robust operative motivations. If either 
motive fell away in full, she would still have plenty of reason 
from the other wellspring for action. 
Which of these individuals violates the Americans with 
Disabilities Act33 (ADA)? The answer is Delta and Beta. The test 
under the ADA is a But-For standard,34 which asks: Would the 
defendant have acted differently but for the illicit motive? For 
Delta and Beta, the answer is “yes.” Without the B-Motive, they 
would not have had sufficient motivation for action. Conversely, 
Alpha and Gamma would have remained motivated for action 
even if the B-Motive were eliminated. 
This description is true not just of these four individuals but 
of all motivational combinations similar to theirs. Figure 2 dis-
plays shaded regions where the law finds a violation of the But-
For standard. It leaves a blank triangle at the lower left to show 
where there is no liability because there is no action—the mo-
tives, even when summed, do not add up to enough (1) to moti-
vate action. 
 
 33 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq. 
 34 See Serwatka v Rockwell Automation, Inc, 591 F3d 957, 962 (7th Cir 2010) (“[A] 
plaintiff complaining of discriminatory discharge under the ADA must show that his or 
her employer would not have fired him but for his actual or perceived disability; proof of 
mixed motives will not suffice.”); Gentry v East West Partners Club Management Co Inc, 
816 F3d 228, 235 (4th Cir 2016) (“The only remaining question is whether the ADA’s text 
calls for a ‘but-for’ causation standard. We hold that it does.”). For other areas of law us-
ing the But-For standard, see notes 7–13 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE 2:  BUT-FOR STANDARD 
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Now let us consider other liability standards. A Primary-
Motive standard would assess motives based on their strength 
relative to one another. Notice that both Alpha and Gamma 
have a substantial degree of A-Motive, but only Gamma also has 
a strong B-Motive. Indeed, Gamma’s B-Motive is stronger than 
her A-Motive. We could assign liability to Gamma on that basis, 
as well as Delta and Beta. The intuition here is that individuals 
are charged with whatever motive was foremost, regardless of 
whether it was big or small in some absolute sense. Figure 3 
displays this possibility. 
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FIGURE 3:  PRIMARY MOTIVE 
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The Primary-Motive standard is the normal approach for 
challenges of malicious prosecution,35 corporate law’s business 
judgment rule,36 racial gerrymandering,37 and most tax matters.38 
 
 35 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 668, cmt c (1977). 
 36 Directors’ decisions are immunized from shareholder challenge if their motives 
were primarily “loyal” even if they had some personal interest in the decision. See Alan 
R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director’s Duty of Independ-
ence, 67 Tex L Rev 1351, 1389 n 151 (1989) (describing mixed motives in corporate law). 
See, for example, Panter v Marshall Field & Co, 646 F2d 271, 304 (7th Cir 1981); Johnson 
v Trueblood, 629 F2d 287, 293 (3d Cir 1980); Cheff v Mathes, 199 A2d 548, 554 (Del 1964). 
 37 See, for example, Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 959 (1996); Miller v Johnson, 515 US 
900, 916 (1995). Racially motivated gerrymanders are subject to strict scrutiny, which is 
often regarded as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, The Supreme 
Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev 1, 8 (1972). But see generally Adam 
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in 
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Another option is a Sole-Motive standard, which would find 
for the defendant only if B-Motive were the solitary motive urg-
ing action, and the defendant would prevail upon showing any 
A-Motive at all. If such a standard governed employment dis-
crimination, all four individuals would avoid penalty for their 
firing. Figure 4 depicts this. 
FIGURE 4:  SOLE MOTIVE 
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the Federal Courts, 59 Vand L Rev 793 (2006) (examining the results of strict scrutiny 
challenges). 
 38 See William A. Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a 
Combination Business and Pleasure Trip—A Conceptual Analysis, 18 Stan L Rev 1099, 
1104 (1966); Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 
U Chi L Rev 485, 508 (1967). See also, for example, Mohn v United States, 2001 WL 
1399366, *5 (ED Mich) (business expenses); Olk v United States, 536 F2d 876, 879 (9th 
Cir 1976) (gifts); Bank of Palm Beach & Trust Co v United States, 476 F2d 1343, 1350 
(Ct Cl 1973) (death benefits); United States v Generes, 405 US 93, 104 (1972) (bad busi-
ness debts). 
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This Sole-Motive standard is used to evaluate legislative 
enactments of retroactive punishment,39 racial profiling by po-
lice,40 intentional interference with business,41 “spite walls” and 
other uses of property intended to frustrate neighbors,42 and the 
tax question of whether a transaction is a “sham” without eco-
nomic substance.43 
The reciprocal of the Sole-Motive standard is the Any-
Motive standard, which rewards the plaintiff whenever bad mo-
tives were at all part of the defendant’s decision even if accepta-
ble motives were very significant. We depict this proplaintiff 
standard in Figure 5. 
 
 39 See Jane Harris Aiken, Ex post Facto in the Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment, 
81 Ky L J 323, 353–59 (1992). See, for example, Wiley v Bowen, 824 F2d 1120, 1122 (DC 
Cir 1987); Flemming v Nestor, 363 US 603, 612 (1960). See also US Const Art I, § 9, cl 3 
(barring ex post facto federal laws). The general ban on punitive law derives in part from 
this Bill of Attainder Clause. Id. 
 40 See William M. Carter Jr, Whren’s Flawed Assumptions Regarding Race, History, 
and Unconscious Bias, 66 Case W Res L Rev 947, 953 (2016). See, for example, United 
States v Avery, 137 F3d 343, 358 (6th Cir 1997). A similar test is applied for probable 
cause of searches generally. See, for example, Commonwealth v Adams, 605 A2d 311, 
313 (Pa 1992). 
 41 See Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, and Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 625 
(West 2d ed 2011). 
 42 See, for example, United States v 480.00 Acres of Land, 557 F3d 1297, 1311 (11th 
Cir 2009) (takings judged by the “primary purpose” standard); Holbrook v Morrison, 100 
NE 1111, 1111 (Mass 1913) (selling property to putatively undesirable owners); Rideout 
v Knox, 19 NE 390, 391 (Mass 1889) (spite wall); Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr, Expropriatory 
Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings 
Clause, 80 NC L Rev 713, 733–34 (2002) (proposing that courts should ask whether the 
primary purpose of a taking is expropriatory rather than regulatory). 
 43 See, for example, Goldstein v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 364 F2d 734, 
741 (2d Cir 1966). 
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FIGURE 5:  ANY-MOTIVE 
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The Any-Motive standard is used, inter alia, to evaluate 
kickback payments to doctors,44 persecutor motives in asylum 
cases,45 core discrimination claims,46 many Batson challenges to 
 
 44 42 USC § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(B) (criminalizing payment “to induce” purchase of items 
or services for which Medicare or Medicaid will ultimately make payment). See United 
States v Narco Freedom, Inc, 95 F Supp 3d 747, 753 (SDNY 2015) (discussing the statute). 
 45 Compare Singh v Gonzalez, 406 F3d 191, 197 (3d Cir 2005) (“[A]n applicant must 
show that the persecution was motivated, at least in part, by one of the protected charac-
teristics.”) (emphasis omitted), with Gebremichael v Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 10 F3d 28, 35 (1st Cir 1993) (finding that the enumerated ground must be at the 
“root of persecution”). The former is the majority rule. See, for example, Lopez-Soto v 
Ashcroft, 383 F3d 228, 236 (4th Cir 2004); Marku v Ashcroft, 380 F3d 982 (6th Cir 2004); 
Girma v Immigration and Naturalization Service, 283 F3d 664, 667 (5th Cir 2002); 
Singh v Ilchert, 63 F3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir 1995); Osorio v Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, 18 F3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir 1994). See also Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, 
Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the Real ID Act Is a False Promise, 43 Harv J Legis 
101, 115–20 (2006) (discussing mixed motives). 
 46 See Verstein, 127 Yale L J at 1114 n 42 (cited in note 24). 
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biased jury selection,47 and interference with employee retire-
ment benefits under ERISA.48 
There are numerous motive rules available, and the fields of 
legal practice draw widely from them. So it is fair to ask what 
justifies the But-For standard over any other workable approach 
in a given context. In the next three Parts, we consider the main 
arguments in favor of the But-For standard, beginning with 
causation. 
II.  CAUSATION 
Should we use theories of causation to evaluate motives? In 
other words, should we acquit defendants of a motive-based of-
fense if their bad motives (though present) were not a but-for 
cause of their act? It may seem obvious that we must. The cen-
tral idea is that a defendant’s illicit motive should justify a rem-
edy only if that motive actually caused harm. If the same actions 
would have taken place regardless of anyone’s bad motives, then 
what difference did the motives play at all? And if they made no 
causal difference, how can it be legitimate to regulate them? 
Recent US Supreme Court opinions give the impression that 
motive-causation is essential as a matter of precedent, back-
ground principles of law, and statutory law. These decisions 
adopted a But-For standard with essentially no policy 
 
 47 See, for example, State v Ornelas, 330 P3d 1085, 1092 (Idaho App 2014) (noting 
that “most states have adopted what is the [sic] referred to as the per se approach”); 
Robinson v United States, 890 A2d 674, 680 (DC 2006); McCormick v State, 803 NE2d 
1108, 1112–13 (Ind 2004); State v Lucas, 18 P3d 160, 163 (Ariz App 2001); State v 
Shuler, 545 SE2d 805, 811 (SC 2001); Payton v Kearse, 495 SE2d 205, 210 (SC 1998); 
State v King, 572 NW2d 530, 535 (Wis App 1997); Rector v State, 444 SE2d 862, 865 (Ga 
App 1994); Owens v State, 531 S2d 22, 23–24 (Ala Crim App 1987). 
 48 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829 (1974). 
See, for example, Teumer v General Motors Corp, 34 F3d 542, 550 (7th Cir 1994) (liable if 
illicit motive “contributed toward the employer’s decision”); Titsch v Reliance Group Inc, 
548 F Supp 983, 985 (SDNY 1982) (contrasting “mere consequence” with “a motivating 
factor”); Pickering v USX Corp, 809 F Supp 1501, 1532 (D Utah 1992) (“[A]n employee 
need only prove that the desire to defeat pension eligibility was a ‘motivating’ or ‘deter-
minative,’ factor behind the challenged conduct.”), quoting Gavalik v Continental Can 
Co, 812 F2d 834, 860 (3d Cir 1987). See also Schlenz v United Airlines, Inc, 678 F Supp 
230, 234–36 (ND Cal 1988) (rejecting a sole-motive standard); Nemeth v Clark 
Equipment Co, 677 F Supp 899, 903 (WD Mich 1987) (rejecting a sole-motive standard). 
See generally Christina A. Smith, Note, The Road to Retirement—Paved with Good 
Intentions but Dotted with Potholes of Untold Liability: ERISA Section 510, Mixed 
Motives and Title VII, 81 Minn L Rev 735 (1997). 
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justification.49 Instead, the Court located a causation require-
ment and deduced a But-For standard from it. 
This Part argues that the turn to causation as a basis for 
the But-For standard is unfounded. Part II.A argues that we 
should not overstate the degree to which the law requires causa-
tion; many motive inquiries are not causal. More importantly, 
even if motives must be causal in order to count, there is no rea-
son to think that this would lead to a But-For standard. 
Part II.B explains why sensible causation analysis would impose 
no such requirement. There is, accordingly, no argument from 
causation in support of a But-For standard for mixed motives. 
A. Is Causation Required? 
Whatever motive-causation would require, it is not clear 
that causation is itself required.50 This Section identifies and 
criticizes the rationales sometimes given for incorporating cau-
sation into a mixed-motives standard. Recent Supreme Court 
decisions articulate three such rationales for their brand of 
motive-causation.51 
 
 49 In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v Nassar, 570 US 338 (2013), 
there is one policy argument: “The proper interpretation and implementation of [the 
statute] and its causation standard have central importance to the fair and responsible 
allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation systems. This is of particular signifi-
cance because claims of retaliation are being made with ever-increasing frequency.” Id at 
343, 358. Interestingly, critics of causation in employment law have long focused on the 
distribution of costs associated with litigation. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful 
Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 Tex L Rev 1655, 1673 (1996). Merely cull-
ing lawsuits is of course not a good thing unless more is said about the quality of the 
lawsuits defeated and the costs and benefits of addressing them some other way. 
 50 Several scholars are skeptical that motives should ever be evaluated for their 
causal relationships. See generally H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law 
(Oxford 2d ed 1985); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and 
the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 Tex L Rev 17 (1991) 
(rejecting that motives can be causal). Professor Martin Katz recognizes such skepticism 
but nevertheless proceeds as though motive can be causal, which he takes courts to ac-
cept. Katz, 94 Georgetown L J at 495 n 17 (cited in note 15). But see Richard Thompson 
Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 Stan L Rev 1381, 
1406 (2014) (“[W]e have realized at least since the time of David Hume that causation is 
less a physical fact than a philosophical dilemma.”). 
 51 Mt. Healthy is often cited, but so is Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, in which causa-
tion was accepted by all four opinions. Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 237 
(1989) (Brennan) (plurality); id at 259 (White concurring); id at 262 (O’Connor concur-
ring); id at 281 (Kennedy dissenting). The plurality opinion differed from the others only 
in its insistence that causation need not be but-for causation. Id at 241–42 (Brennan) 
(plurality). Note that, despite rejecting but-for causation, the plurality still would have 
denied a plaintiff any remedy if a But-For standard is not met. Id at 249 (Brennan) (plu-
rality) (“A court that finds for a plaintiff under this standard has effectively concluded 
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First, the Court has pointed to its own past decisions, apply-
ing seemingly similar causation standards.52 
Second, the Court has derived the standard from the back-
ground of “textbook tort law.”53 On a page punctuated with cita-
tions to a torts treatise and the Restatement of Torts (First, 
Second, and Third),54 the Court in University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v Nassar55 declared that such tort 
principles “are the default rules [Congress] is presumed to have 
incorporated, absent an indication to the contrary in the statute 
itself.”56 
Third, the Court has located the requirement in statutory 
text. For example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act57 
(ADEA) protects employees from adverse workplace treatment 
“because of such individual’s age.”58 Justice Clarence Thomas 
cited three dictionaries and one case to deduce that “because of” 
means “causation.”59 From causation, but-for causation followed 
almost deductively.60 
The following Sections argue against requiring causation on 
the foregoing bases. 
1. The Court’s own decisions. 
Despite the recent enthusiasm for motive-causation, it is not 
an ancient and venerable doctrine. As recently as 1972, the 
Supreme Court wrote that causal analysis in a mixed-motives 
 
that an illegitimate motive was a ‘but-for’ cause of the employment decision.”). Eviden-
tiary problems mattered, but only with respect to the burden shifting procedure, not the 
ultimate But-For standard. Id at 271–75 (O’Connor concurring). 
 52 See Nassar, 570 US at 346–51. 
 53 Id at 347. The second sentence of the opinion explains: “The requisite relation 
between prohibited conduct and compensable injury is governed by the principles of cau-
sation, a subject most often arising in elaborating the law of torts.” Id at 342. 
 54 Id at 346–47. 
 55 570 US 338 (2013). 
 56 Id at 347. 
 57 Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602 (1967), codified at 29 USC § 621 et seq. 
 58 29 USC § 623(a)(1). Similar language supported causation analysis in Price 
Waterhouse. That case’s statute—42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(2)—likewise prohibited adverse 
employment action “because of” prohibited factors, and all but one justice explicitly as-
serted a causal relationship between motive and act. Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 241 
(Brennan) (plurality); id at 262 (O’Connor concurring); id at 281 (Kennedy dissenting). 
 59 Gross v FBL Financial Services, Inc, 557 US 167, 176 (2009). 
 60 Id at 177 (“It follows, then, that under § 623(a)(1), the plaintiff retains the bur-
den of persuasion to establish that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse 
action.”). 
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case is a “temptation . . . best rejected, and we reject it here.”61 
Causation entered mixed-motives analysis in 1978 with Mt. 
Healthy,62 which derived motive-causation from a rather cryptic 
analogy to cases involving neither motives nor causation: “In 
other areas of constitutional law, this Court has found it neces-
sary to formulate a test of causation which distinguishes be-
tween a result caused by a constitutional violation and one not 
so caused. We think those are instructive in formulating the test 
to be applied here.”63 
Those “other areas” were all “tainted evidence” cases, in 
which criminal convictions were upheld despite coerced or oth-
erwise problematic confessions.64 
It is fine to draw analogies to other areas built on causation. 
Unfortunately, none of the cited cases so much as discusses 
 
 61 United States v Generes, 405 US 93, 105 (1972). 
 62 Nassar, 570 US at 360, and Gross, 557 US at 176–77, adopt a But-For standard 
familiar from Price Waterhouse. In Price Waterhouse, causation was the only argument 
accepted by all four opinions, and all four opinions cited Mt. Healthy. Price Waterhouse, 
490 US at 248–49 (Brennan) (plurality); id at 258–60 (White concurring); id at 277 
(O’Connor concurring); id at 289–90 (Kennedy dissenting). 
 Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, 429 US 252 
(1977), also deserves some credit for introducing motive-causation. In an oft-cited foot-
note, the Court wrote: 
[If] the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose 
not been considered . . . the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer 
fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper consideration of a 
discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances, there would be no justification 
for judicial interference with the challenged decision. 
Id at 270–71 n 21. 
 Although this passage does not use the word “causation,” later courts have cited it to 
justify their causal approach to mixed motives. See, for example, Price Waterhouse, 490 
US at 249 (“A court that finds for a plaintiff under this standard has effectively concluded 
that an illegitimate motive was a ‘but-for’ cause of the employment decision.”), citing 
Arlington Heights, 429 US at 270–71 n 21. Still, sharing credit between Arlington 
Heights and Mt. Healthy would do little to extend motive-causation’s ancestry: these two 
cases were decided on the same day. Note that Nassar and Gross differ from earlier But-
For standard cases in their allocation of the burden of proof. Price Waterhouse permitted 
the burden to shift to the defendants, while Nassar and Gross did not. This article focuses 
only on the motive standard, not on who bears the burden of proving it. See Verstein, 
127 Yale L J at 1134 n 99 (cited in note 24). 
 63 Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 286. 
 64 See, for example, Parker v North Carolina, 397 US 790, 796 (1970); Wong Sun v 
United States, 371 US 471, 491 (1963); Lyons v Oklahoma, 322 US 596, 607 (1944). The 
Court cited cases overlooking improperly obtained confessions or guilty pleas for analogy 
despite noting the differences between that context and Doyle’s claim: “While the type of 
causation on which the taint cases turn may differ somewhat from that which we apply 
here, those cases do suggest that the proper test to apply in the present context. . . .” Mt. 
Healthy, 429 US at 287. 
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causation at all, or uses the words “causation” or “cause” (apart 
from terms of art like “probable cause”), let alone draws on 
causation to justify its holding.65 Causation thus insinuated it-
self into motive jurisprudence only recently and on mysterious 
terms.66 
Motive-causation analysis’s recent and peculiar emergence 
tarnishes any effort to link motive-causation to enduring back-
ground principles of law. Motive-causation was invented just re-
cently, so it cannot be a self-evident entailment of deep tort 
principles, for example. Nevertheless, several recent Supreme 
 
 65 One of the three cases (Parker) cites to a case (Nardone) that does invoke causal 
metaphors. Parker, 397 US at 796, citing Nardone v United States, 308 US 338, 341 
(1939) (“Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information ob-
tained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government’s proof.”). Later courts have 
likewise drawn on causation as an analogy. In re M.S., 896 P2d 1365, 1385 n 1 (Cal 
1995) (Kennard concurring) (“Although the analogy is admittedly not exact, it is suffi-
ciently close to be helpful, at least in the absence of another and superior method of 
analysis.”). But none of those causation passages is quoted or cited in Mt. Healthy or 
even Parker. And even Nardone does not derive from causation a clear endorsement of a 
But-For standard. Nardone, 308 US at 341 (“A sensible way of dealing with such a situa-
tion . . . ought to be within the reach of experienced trial judges.”). So motive-causation 
was born in an analogy to cases that address neither motive nor causation. 
 One could have pushed the roots further back still: Why was causation cited in even 
one tainted evidence case? It is possible that causation’s appeal has sometimes operated 
more subliminally than rationally. One of the evidence cases cited in Mt. Healthy men-
tioned “probable cause” twenty-four times. See generally Wong Sun, 371 US 471. Like-
wise, all Batson decisions are rife with references to “for cause” strikes. Is it possible that 
the mere earliest germ of causation analysis was simple homophony? 
 66 Nor is there discussion of causation in Mt. Healthy’s lower court opinions, appel-
late briefs, or oral argument. The closest reference I can find to causation is as follows: 
Where, for example, an employer is shown to have engaged in a pattern and 
practice of racial discrimination in hiring, the impermissible factor of race can 
be said to have played a part each time a black employee was denied a job. 
 
. . . 
 
In the instant case the showing is stronger: here the finding of causation does 
not rest upon an inference from a pattern of conduct, but rather upon the em-
ployer’s own admission that he relied upon the impermissible factor. 
Doyle Brief at *43 & n 20 (cited in note 1). See also Michael Wells, Three Arguments 
against Mt. Healthy: Tort Theory, Constitutional Torts, and Freedom of Speech, 51 
Mercer L Rev 583, 599 (2000) (citation omitted): 
Despite the importance of causation, Mt. Healthy addresses the issue in just 
three pages at the end of an opinion devoted mainly to other matters. No doubt 
three pages would be sufficient, if they were used wisely. However, the Court 
in Mt. Healthy offered only fragments of arguments rather than cogent reason-
ing. The result is an unconvincing hodgepodge that leaves unanswered the dif-
ficult questions raised by the causation issue. 
746 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:725 
 
Court cases have dressed up motive-causation with respectable 
vestments. We have seen that these arguments are ahistorical, 
but the following Section shows how they are also illogical. 
2. Background principles of law. 
In Nassar, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion im-
posed a causation requirement on mixed-motive retaliation cases 
on the basis of background tort principles. He begins the opinion 
by asserting such principles, without citation: 
When the law grants persons the right to compensation for 
injury from wrongful conduct, there must be some demon-
strated connection, some link, between the injury sustained 
and the wrong alleged. The requisite relation between pro-
hibited conduct and compensable injury is governed by the 
principles of causation, a subject most often arising in elab-
orating the law of torts.67 
These principles of causation are “the background against which 
Congress legislated in enacting Title VII, and these are the de-
fault rules it is presumed to have incorporated, absent an indi-
cation to the contrary in the statute itself.”68 A “standard re-
quirement” arising from these background principles is 
“[c]ausation in fact—i.e., proof that the defendant’s conduct did 
in fact cause the plaintiff’s injury.”69 Therefore, any law per-
taining to injury and compensation must meet tort standards 
of causation. 
There are three problems with deriving a causation stand-
ard from background principles of tort law. First, by their own 
terms, such arguments do not reach many areas of the law in 
which the But-For test is deployed. While employment discrimi-
nation is arguably a statutory tort focused on compensating in-
jured employees,70 other areas of the law are not torts and are 
not focused squarely on compensation. For example, the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from striking potential 
 
 67 Nassar, 570 US at 342. 
 68 Id at 347. 
 69 Id at 346. 
 70 But see United States v Burke, 504 US 229, 241 (1992) (holding that Title VII 
claims are not tort-like for the purpose of excluding damages awarded for them from 
gross income under IRS regulations). 
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jurors based on their race or sex.71 When motives are mixed, the 
majority of federal courts adopt a But-For standard to evaluate 
prosecutor motives.72 Often, they derive this standard by assum-
ing the relevance of causation, either without argument or solely 
by citing other cases’ invocation of causal principles.73 Yet 
Batson challenges to discriminatory jury selection are not torts, 
and they are not primarily concerned with injury and compensa-
tion, so it is an error to directly or derivatively import a causa-
tion requirement on the basis of background tort principles.74 
Second, while tort principles may presumptively govern 
common law torts, statutory torts do not automatically partake 
of common law tort principles.75 Professor Jonathan Cardi and 
others have argued that statutory torts incorporate common law 
principles only if the statute explicitly says so. If something is 
required of torts at common law, it is not presumptively applica-
ble to statutory torts such as employment discrimination or 
market manipulation.76 
Third, and most importantly, it is an error to think that 
background principles of tort law teach that motives must be 
 
 71 See Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 89 (1986); J.E.B. v Alabama, 511 US 127, 129 
(1994) (holding “that gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence 
and impartiality”). 
 72 See, for example, Gattis v Snyder, 278 F3d 222, 234–35 (3d Cir 2002); Weaver v 
Bowersox, 241 F3d 1024, 1032 (8th Cir 2001); King v Moore, 196 F3d 1327, 1335 (11th 
Cir 1999); Wallace v Morrison, 87 F3d 1271, 1274–75 (11th Cir 1996); United States v 
Tokars, 95 F3d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir 1996); United States v Darden, 70 F3d 1507, 1531 
(8th Cir 1995); Jones v Plaster, 57 F3d 417, 421 (4th Cir 1995); Howard v Senkowski, 986 
F2d 24, 26 (2d Cir 1993). 
 73 See, for example, Kesser v Cambra, 465 F3d 351, 372 (9th Cir 2006), citing Mt. 
Healthy, 429 US at 287; Arlington Heights, 429 US at 270 n 21. 
 74 Other areas of law have rejected the But-For standard in large part because the 
court rejected the tutelage of tort doctrine. See, for example, Generes, 405 US at 105. 
 75 See W. Jonathan Cardi, The Role of Negligence Duty Analysis in Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 75 Ohio St L J 1129, 1160–61 (2014) (“[I]f courts are indeed en-
gaging in common-law tort duty analysis, such practice is improper under the law gov-
erning statutory torts.”); Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposal to Strengthen 
the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87 Yale L J 447, 461 & 
n 59 (1978) (arguing that “[c]ommon law notions . . . simply have no place” in statutory 
civil rights litigation). 
 76 Securities law scholars are familiar with the Supreme Court’s ambivalent ap-
proach developing 10b-5 claims upon common law tort theory. See, for example, 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v Scientific-Atlantic, Inc, 552 US 148, 162 (2007) 
(“Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law.”). See also gen-
erally Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 Iowa 
L Rev 811 (2009). Section 11 of the Securities Act does not require causation. See Robert 
Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 Wayne L Rev 1235, 1242–43 
n 27 (1988). 
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causal. Tort principles certainly do require that the defendant’s 
action or negligence as a whole caused the plaintiff’s injury, but 
they do not entail that every element or aspect of the conduct in-
jured the plaintiff. To infer from the fact that tort law cares 
about causation that motive must be causal is to commit a fallacy 
of division,77 akin to inferring that hydrogen is wet because wa-
ter is wet.78 Torts actions as a whole must satisfy several ele-
ments, one of which is causation, but it does not then follow that 
each element of a claim (such as motive) must satisfy a causa-
tion standard. 
To see the error in this inference, consider a parallel infer-
ence drawing on the tort of battery. The elements of battery are 
(1) intent, (2) act, (3) causation, and (4) contact that is 
(5) harmful or offensive and (6) without consent or privilege. 
How do these elements interact? These elements are partially 
interdependent. For example, the (2) act must play a (3) causal 
role. But they are not fully interdependent. No one would sug-
gest that (6) lack of privilege must play a (3) causal role. It is no 
defense to a proven case of battery that the defendant would 
have acted identically even if the plaintiff had given her permis-
sion for the harmful contact, and hence lack of consent or privi-
lege was causally inert. No one thinks, for that matter, that the 
defendant’s (2) intent must have been without (6) consent or 
privilege. 
These remarks accord with courts’ actual treatment of men-
tal causation in tort cases. Courts are generally clear about the 
independence of the mental elements from such requirements.79 
They do not seem to impose causation requirements on mental 
 
 77 Oxford English Dictionary 693 (Clarendon 2d ed 1989) (defining “fallacy of divi-
sion, the fallacy that whatever is true of a whole must be true of any part or member of 
that whole”). 
 78 See John R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science 22 (Harvard 1984). 
 79 See Fire Insurance Exchange v Altieri, 1 Cal Rptr 2d 360, 364 (Cal App 1991), 
quoting J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co v M.K., 804 P2d 689, 699 (Cal 1991): 
The focus is on the harmful nature of the insured’s act, not on his or her sub-
jective intent to cause harm. “Motive is irrelevant for purposes of [law barring 
insurance coverage for intentional torts]. Motive is relevant only to the different 
question of whether the conduct was wrongful, thereby giving rise to liability.” 
See also Atlantic Lloyd’s Insurance Co of Texas v Scott Wetzel Services, Inc, 1997 WL 
211537, *5 (Tex App) (“Intent to cause injury is irrelevant when determining whether 
the injury was caused by accident.”). 
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elements.80 Thus, there is little in tort law to support requiring 
motive-causation.81 
To summarize, it’s clear that bad motives must stand in 
some relationship to a challenged corporate firing or congres-
sional enactment in order for the plaintiff to prevail, but it does 
not follow from background principles of tort law that the rela-
tionship must be causal. We should be even more skeptical as 
we move from common law to statutory torts (for example, em-
ployment retaliation), and from statutory torts to nontorts (for 
example, jury selection). 
3. Statutory language. 
Whatever the background principles of law, it is clear that a 
statute can stipulate to courts that they should hold motives to a 
causal standard. Do statutes actually do this? To the contrary, 
no statute uses the word “causation” in setting out a motive-
based rule.82 
 
 80 The closest I can find are stray sentences, such as the following: “Additionally, 
the defendant’s conduct must not only be intentional, but must also be ‘improper in mo-
tive or means, causing harm to the plaintiff.’” Premier Technical Sales, Inc v Digital 
Equipment Corp, 11 F Supp 2d 1156, 1166 (ND Cal 1998), citing Draghetti v Chmielewski, 
626 NE2d 862 (Mass 1994). Such dicta is far from convincing proof that mental states 
must causally impact the harm. 
 81 It is true that tort law may require that the tortious aspect of a plaintiff’s conduct 
must contribute to an injury. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm § 26, cmt g. For example, a hunter is not liable for negligently handing 
a loaded rifle to a child if the child’s subsequent injury comes only from dropping the gun 
on her toe. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
§ 29, cmt d, illus 3 (2010). Such a defendant was clearly a cause of the injury, but he es-
capes liability because the injury (a broken toe) bore no causal relationship to his negli-
gent act (leaving bullets in the gun). It might seem that causally inert wrongfulness 
cannot give rise to liability. 
 Alas, we have traced tort principles upriver from causation into another tributary 
entirely. The rifle injury example is drawn from a Restatement section on limitations to 
scope of liability, what was once called “proximate cause.” The current Restatement dis-
courages use of the term “proximate cause” as a source of confusion. Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 27, cmt b (2010). The idea that the 
wrongfulness of the act must create the harm is not part of “cause-in-fact.” It is not part 
of the empirical sort of causation required by Justice Kennedy in Nassar and that we 
have been exploring. It is instead part of the normative, policy-driven, world of 
assignment-of-responsibility. To state that individuals can sometimes escape liability for 
harms they cause, even when they have acted wrongfully, is merely to highlight the im-
portance of identifying the factors that make salient one wrongful act but not another. 
And that is the task for some inquiry other than causation. 
 82 See Gudel, 70 Tex L Rev at 92 (cited in note 50). Nor does the legislative history of 
important statutes decisively establish motive-causation. See Heather K. Gerken, Note, 
Understanding Mixed Motives Claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Analysis of 
Intentional Discrimination Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions, 91 
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For example, the ADEA prohibits discrimination “because of 
. . . age.”83 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 likewise pro-
hibits discrimination “because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”84 
Courts have often read “because of” language as requiring a 
causal link between the discriminatory motive and harm.85 
Many scholars have also accepted that “because of” is causal 
language.86 Yet there are good reasons to resist such interpreta-
tion. There are noncausal ways to read apparently causal stat-
utes, and the common body of mixed-motives jurisprudence is 
threatened if courts lean heavily on fine gradations of word 
choice. The remainder of this Section is devoted to those two ob-
jections to a causal construal of ambiguous statutory language. 
To begin, “because of” is obviously an ambiguous phrase. It 
can indicate a causation, but we also use it in all sorts of non-
causative contexts, such as whenever we seek to explain.87 
Some explanations are causal,88 but not all. Some explanations 
 
Mich L Rev 1824, 1839 (1993). The conference report accompanying the Civil Rights Act 
explains that “any discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested 
employment decision may be the subject of liability. Conduct or statements are relevant 
under this test only if the plaintiff shows a nexus between the conduct or statements and 
the employment decision at issue.” HR Rep No 101-856, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 18–19 
(1990). If an employment action can be “because of” motive when that motive plays a role 
or has a nexus with the outcome, it suggests that causation is not the only way to estab-
lish an appropriate link. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1205 (Thomson Reuters 10th ed 
2014) (defining “nexus” as “[a] connection or link, often a causal one”). 
 83 29 USC § 623(a). See also 42 USC § 2000ff-1(a) (barring discrimination “because 
of genetic information”); 42 USC §§ 3604(a), 3605 (barring discrimination “because of” 
protected statuses in connection with housing or financing of real estate). 
 84 42 USC § 2000e-2(a). 
 85 See, for example, Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 241 (Brennan) (plurality) (arguing 
that “because of” need not be “divest[ed] of causal significance”); id at 260 (White concur-
ring); id at 262 (O’Connor concurring) (arguing that the plain language of Title VII re-
quires causation); id at 281–82 (Kennedy dissenting). 
 86 See, for example, Noah D. Zatz, The Many Meanings of “Because of”: A Comment 
on Inclusive Communities Project, 68 Stan L Rev Online 68, 72 (2015) (“The phrase ‘be-
cause of’ refers directly to causal concepts, not mental ones.”); Cardi, 75 Ohio St L J at 
1135 (cited in note 75) (accepting that “because of” means causation); David S. Schwartz, 
When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U 
Pa L Rev 1697, 1709 (2002) (“The phrase ‘because of’ implies a causal connection.”). 
 87 See Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Motive, Intention, and Morality in the Criminal Law, 
28 Crim Just Rev 317, 323 (2003). Courts engaged in motive analysis frequently empha-
size “explanation” rather than causation. See, for example, Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630, 
643–44 (1993). 
 88 See generally Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure 
of the World (Princeton 1984) (arguing that explanation amounts to description of caus-
es). See also Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the 
Philosophy of Science 331–497 (Free Press 1965). 
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are interpretive,89 constructive,90 pragmatic,91 or teleological.92 
Any of these are semantically compatible with statutory lan-
guage, as I demonstrate in the following paragraphs. 
For example, we might tutor a confused math student with 
the phrase “X is 7 and not −7 because of this operation on the 
previous line.” This use of “because of” is not causal in the physi-
calist sense typically invoked by contemporary tort theory. That 
is true even if we insert more explicitly causal language: “This 
operation on the previous line caused X to be 7 and not −7.” 
Causal metaphors are tempting even in math problems, but we 
can be sure that whatever mathematical law “caused” X to be 7 
is quite unlike whatever “caused” a boss to fire someone. 
We also say “because of” in settings calling for characteriza-
tion. Imagine that we agree that an amount is deductible if 
 
 89 See Gudel, 70 Tex L Rev at 92 (cited in note 50). 
 90 See Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image 97–153 (Clarendon 1980). On a 
constructivist view, explanations must be empirically adequate. A constructivist judge 
may find a firing to be “because of” motive if a motive-based account was consistent with 
all of the observed data. This would suggest a far more permissive standard than a But-
For standard—probably an Any-Motive standard. 
 91 See generally Peter Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation (Oxford 1983). On 
Professor Peter Achinstein’s account, something counts as an explanation if it both is an 
assertion of some true state of affairs and also succeeds in helping a particular individual 
understand why that state of affairs in fact answers some relevant question. For exam-
ples, see Peter Achinstein, The Pragmatic Character of Explanation, 1984 Proceedings of 
the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 275, 282. Thus, “because of 
race” on such a pragmatic account might be understood to emphasize the comprehensi-
bility of race as an explanation to particular listeners (The victim? The factfinder?) ra-
ther than from some objective, depersonalized perspective. See also id at 286. 
 92 See generally Martha Craven Nussbaum, Aristotle on Teleological Explanation, 
in Martha Craven Nussbaum, ed, Aristotle’s De Mout Animalium 59–99 (Princeton 
1978). A teleological explanation cites the goal-directed nature of a thing. For example, 
why did a lion rush at a flock of sheep? A nonteleological explanation may cite anteced-
ent physical changes (a muscle spasm here and there), but it may be simpler and more 
useful to say that the nature of a lion is a kind of boldness directed toward its survival 
and that this is why the lion charged. A teleological discrimination statute might use 
“because of” to denote instances in which the most general and predictive explanation of 
the conduct is race. For example, when someone fires someone for race (among other 
reasons) and this is the sort of reason this boss generally and predictably accepts, then 
we have explained the firing as because of race in the teleological sense. Conversely, 
even when race may have been a significant factor, it might not trigger a teleological ex-
planation if it is deeply out of keeping with the form of discrimination. If a lion did does 
something peculiar like sing, we could not “explain” the lion’s singing by reference to the 
nature and telos of a lion. Likewise, even if race played a causal role in a firing, if this 
was quite an exceptional fluke, then the firing might not be best explained by the telos of 
a racist boss so much as by the fluke. The foregoing, which is my interpretation of 
Nussbaum on Aristotle, would direct the statutory prohibition most focally on durable 
and general structures of discrimination, which plausibly reflects the law’s goal of chang-
ing and penalizing enduring oppressive structures. 
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spent “because of” business and that I ask about whether my 
Wall Street Journal subscription is deductible. I am not propos-
ing causal inquiry, such as whether “business” made me sub-
scribe. I may know well what made me subscribe—some mixture 
of intrinsic interest in the stories and the sense that it will help 
me with work, etc. The crucial question is whether that list of 
reasons counts as business.93 Shall we characterize this as a 
business expense or not? Characterization is ubiquitous in law, 
and it would be unsurprising if an antidiscrimination statute 
used the language of characterization.94 
Even if “because of” entailed causation under the ADEA and 
Title VII, it would not follow that all statutes, with or without 
reminiscent language, are similarly fixated on motive-causation. 
Other discrimination statutes use different language,95 and some 
use no plausibly causal language. For example, the prohibition 
on discrimination in contracting simply provides, “All citizens of 
the United States shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by 
white citizens.”96 This language seems to award certain entitle-
ments or require certain outcomes without special regard to 
causal influence of any particular impediment. 
Other laws associated with a But-For standard make no 
textual reference that can be used to identify the status of cau-
sation. For example, market manipulation is prosecuted under 
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934,97 which reads, in relevant 
part, “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”98 Courts con-
fronting mixed-motives market manipulation will find no explicit 
reference to mental states or causation. Likewise, free expression 
 
 93 See Blum, 34 U Chi L Rev at 502 (cited in note 38) (arguing that an objective 
standard of “related to” comes to dominate much of motives analysis). 
 94 It is easy to mix these things up. See Schwartz, 150 U Pa L Rev at 1710 (2002) 
(cited in note 86) (“[C]ausation in discrimination cases asks whether the harm to the 
plaintiff was discriminatory in nature.”). This is far from obvious. Whether something 
was “X in nature” is a different question from whether “X caused Y.” 
 95 For example, Title VIII, the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 800, Pub L No 90-
284, 82 Stat 81, uses three different causal language formulations: “because of” in 42 
USC §§ 3604(a), (b), (d), 3605, 3631(a); “based on” in 42 USC § 3604(c); and “on account 
of” in 42 USC §§ 3606, 3617, 3631(b). The ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) § 5, Pub L No 
110-325, 122 Stat 3553 (2008), codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq, amended the ADA to 
prohibit discrimination “on the basis of” disability rather than “because of” disability. 
 96 42 USC § 1982. 
 97 48 Stat 881, codified at 15 USC § 78a et seq. 
 98 15 USC § 78j. Manipulation is also prohibited under § 9, which gives little more 
instruction. 15 USC § 78i. 
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and equal protection claims in constitutional law, which are sub-
ject to the But-For standard, draw on constitutional amend-
ments lacking any singing endorsement of causation.99 There is 
no “because of” language to hint at causation. If statutory text is 
the cradle of causation requirements, a great many laws—
addressing discrimination and otherwise—might be exempt. 
Even when a legal rule is apparently stated in terms of cau-
sation, we should not be too quick to assume that its actual con-
tent is causal. The test for whether an employer is liable for the 
death or injury of a traveling employee depends on whether the 
travel was within the course of employment, which in turn 
seems to invoke causation: “The test as to whether a given trip 
is within the course of employment where both business and 
personal motives are involved is whether the business motive 
was a concurrent cause of the trip.”100 But the conditions for es-
tablishing a “concurrent cause” are really about moral responsi-
bility, knowledge, and endorsement rather than actual causal 
influence: “There must at least be some action on the part of the 
employer to connect the trip to employment, some sponsorship, 
some approval, some employer action must be present.”101 If en-
dorsement is present, the “causation” standard is met even if the 
employer “does not sponsor or encourage the trip.”102 The pur-
portedly causal motive standard can be satisfied if an employer 
approves of a trip but does not request or urge it. The causal la-
bel drops out (in favor of a responsibility characterization) once 
the test is elaborated and applied. A reader looking at only the 
Westlaw headnote would wrongly overstate the law’s commit-
ment to causal analysis. 
The point of the foregoing is not to show conclusively that 
the better interpretation of a given statutory text or judicial rule 
precludes a causation requirement in any given case.103 Rather it 
 
 99 US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”); US Const Amend XIV (“No State shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 100 Matter of Tally v Newberry Co, 30 AD2d 898, 898 (NY App 1968). 
 101 Id at 899. See also Sturgeon Electric Co v Industrial Commission of Arizona, 
2015 WL 871813, *4 (Ariz App). 
 102 Tally, 30 AD2d at 899. 
 103 It is also possible that ambiguous language such as “because of” should be read 
capaciously to allow both causal and noncausal claims. For example, numerous scholars 
have urged a causation-based approach to discrimination law in order to help plaintiffs 
overcome problems of proving a defendant’s bad motive. See, for example, Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan L Rev 1161, 1242–43 (1995). Yet a pure 
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is to show that causation is not singularly plausible and that 
any statutory derivation of causation must be settled either 
through policy arguments or through extended textual analysis 
intended to clarify the potentially ambiguous meaning. 
And when that analysis is done, the lesson may well be 
bounded to that area of law; even if, say, employment discrimi-
nation law calls for causation, it would be a mistake for disputes 
arising under different statutes—say, market manipulation or 
constitutional law—to partake of the other domain’s preference 
for causation. A certain kind of fixation with statutory language 
would tend to split the law’s motive jurisprudence at a time 
when comparison and cross-substantive learning would seem 
desirable. The price of a text-born motive-causation requirement 
is a balkanized motive jurisprudence, in which the lessons of one 
legal controversy have little to teach the others. 
B. What Does Causation Require? 
To whatever degree that general principles or statutory text 
compel plaintiffs to prove motive-causation, they simply do not 
entail a But-For standard. It is true that but-for causation is the 
first and central test for causation in tort law.104 However, an 
item failing the but-for test can still be a cause. 
This is clearest in cases with multiple sufficient causes.105 If 
two raging fires both strike a house, neither is a but-for cause—
the house would be destroyed by the other fire if the first one did 
not exist—but liability can attach to either fire starter because 
each individual’s negligence was sufficient to cause the injury.106 
 
causation-based approach would disadvantage plaintiffs who can show motive but can-
not easily show causation. Those sympathetic to plaintiffs may therefore be sympathetic 
to reading “because of” inclusively in order to capture appropriate links, be they causal 
or noncausal. 
 104 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 26 
(2010) (stating that but-for causes are causes in fact). 
 105 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
§ 26 (2010) (necessary cause is a cause). See also id at § 27 (multiple sufficient cause is a 
factual cause); Restatement of Torts § 432(2) (1934) (“If two forces are actively operating 
. . . and each of itself is sufficient . . . the actor’s negligence may be held by the jury to be 
a substantial factor.”). See also Katz, 94 Georgetown L J at 494 (cited in note 15) (pro-
posing the “necessity-or-sufficiency” test for motive in employment discrimination). 
 106 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 27 
(2010). The first and second Restatements used the term “substantial factor” to cover 
these overdetermined cases. See, for example, Restatement of Torts § 432(2) (1934). See 
also Barbara A. Spellman and Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation between Counterfactual 
(“But For”) and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and Implications for Jurors’ 
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Tort law regards each one as a cause of the terrifying blaze to 
which it contributes. 
If we analogize a defendant’s motives as potential causes of 
the action, then mixed motives are analogous to torts with multi-
ple causes. A termination resulting from a bad reason (hostility 
toward the employee-plaintiff’s race) and also a good one (hostil-
ity toward her absenteeism) is akin to a fire resulting from a tor-
tious cause (the defendant’s match) and a nontortious one (a 
lightning bolt).107 Neither is the but-for cause of the destruction 
because either motive might be subtracted and the other would 
be adequate to spur action, but both causes satisfy the causation 
requirement. 
Tort law therefore endorses causation both in the same 
places as the But-For standard (Quadrants I and IV) as well as 
the region of overdetermination, Quadrant II. The test that 
would implement conventional tort causation is not a But-For 
standard; it is the Causal-Motive standard, which finds for the 
plaintiff except in Quadrant III. Such a liability zone is depicted 
in Figure 6.108 
 
Decisions, 64 Law & Contemp Probs 241, 254 (2001) (finding that experimental subjects 
agreed that multiple sufficient causes were each a cause). 
 107 Or perhaps this analogy is closer if the defendant is in fact the source of both inno-
cent and culpable causal channels—a negligent match dropping and a nonnegligent one. 
 108 See Katz, 94 Georgetown L J at 494 (cited in note 15) (advocating for what 
amounts to a Causal-Motive test). I have called this the “Causal-Motive” standard in 
previous work precisely because it jives with a conservative reading of black letter tort 
causation. See Verstein, 127 Yale L J at 1154–59 (cited in note 24). 
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FIGURE 6:  CAUSAL MOTIVE 
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Even in Quadrant III, the absent upper left-hand corner, we 
should note that the Restatement is agnostic as to causation. 
There is a reasonable case to be made that causation should be 
found even in Quadrant III, which is to say, in every region. 
Recall that, in Quadrant III, A-Motive is sufficient on its 
own to motivate action, and B-Motive is neither independently 
sufficient nor is it necessary given the strength of the A-Motive. 
Under such parameters, it is perhaps not intuitive to regard the 
B-Motive as a cause; the B-Motive is like a match that is tossed 
on a blazing inferno. And yet the Restatement does not rule out 
tiny matches,109 and it does not rule out this most expansive con-
ception of multiple causation. 
 
 109 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
§ 26, cmt j (2010) (eliminating discretion for factfinder to find no factual causation on 
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The argument is that small causes, though dwarfed by a 
larger cause, do still have a causal impact. They assure the out-
come against some set of background facts—namely a partial 
slice of the presently robust alternative cause. They are there-
fore necessary elements of a sufficient set—which, according to 
scholars such as Professor Richard Wright, is what we mean by 
“cause.”110 The tiny match is a necessary member of a causally 
sufficient set: the portion of the inferno that was not quite big 
enough to destroy the house is made big enough by the match. 
To see this “portion” notion in action, consider an action 
that was amply motivated by an acceptable motive (1.5), with an 
additional and independently insufficient bad motive also oper-
ating (0.5). This is akin to a raging inferno into which one tosses 
some matches, which would normally be inconsequential. For 
exposition, we can describe the intensity of the blaze as 1.5, 
where 1 is sufficient to reach and destroy the house. The matches 
contribute an additional 0.5, by themselves far too little to de-
stroy the house. 
The entire fire is analogous to a defendant’s total motiva-
tional state. The large fire is analogous to the defendant’s large 
acceptable motive, sufficient to cause the harmful fire or firing. 
The small portion of the fire emanating from the match is 
analogous to the putatively superfluous bad motive, by itself too 
small to change anything. 
 
grounds that putative cause was not sufficiently substantial); id at § 27, cmt b (same for 
multiple causes). The Restatement preserves the possibility that an actor should be ex-
empt from liability when its contribution was “only a trivial contribution” but that ex-
emption operates not by way of causation analysis. The actor (and its conduct) remains a 
cause. The exemption is effected by way of the scope-of-liability analysis. Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 36 (2010). 
 110 Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal L Rev 1735, 1788–1803 (1985). 
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One way to think about causation here is to see that, in the 
universe of causes, where “1” is the minimum amount to be ef-
fective, the acceptable motive or large fire is more than suffi-
cient. There is a causal set sufficient to meet or exceed “1” that 
draws exclusively on the larger cause (be it an acceptable motive 
or a fire). We can name this designation “Sufficient Set 1” be-
cause it contains enough to cause the observed result. This set 
leaves some other material unnecessary, including a third of the 
primary cause as well as all of the secondary cause. On this con-
strual, the matches or B-Motive are truly incidental. 
But why draw the lines in that way? We could just as easily 
bracket the set defined by “Sufficient Set 2.” Here, the bad mo-
tive (or the matches) forms a vital part of the motive set (or fire) 
that would lead to the harm. The one-half it contributes is fully 
half of the sufficient set, the other half of which is composed of 
one-third of the blaze or acceptable motive. And on the sidelines, 
unnecessary for the sufficient set, is some additional portion of 
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the acceptable motive (or large fire). There are two perfectly 
sensible descriptions of the fire or firing, one in which the small 
factor was pivotal. 
If we were so inclined, we could think of the bad motive 
pairing with a portion of the acceptable motive and succeeding 
in completing a causal set with that portion. If we accept the 
fungible, partial causal pairings, we can find causation any-
where that the sum of good and bad motives combines as suffi-
cient to motivate action. Sufficient Set 2 is also sufficient to de-
stroy the house or motivate the action, and it construes a large 
part of the large motive as unnecessary rather than a bit of both 
motives. 
We can superimpose this combination idea onto our familiar 
Cartesian depiction of motives. Figure 8 shows how we can 
think of a small portion of the acceptable motive (here, one-half, 
or one-third of the total) combining with the bad motive to cross 
the threshold into Quadrant IV. The remaining acceptable mo-
tive can be thought of as causally irrelevant if we wish to apply 
that label to the factors that could be removed without changing 
the result. 
The ability to pair portions of each motive dramatically in-
creases the causal significance of even lesser motives. Opera-
tionalizing this approach means adding Quadrant III to the 
Causal-Motive test, which results in an Any-Motive test. 
Figure 9 depicts a rule drawn from this version of tort causation, 
which would apply to any combination of motives so long as 
some illicit motive is present. On such a construal, causation is 
established in all mixed-motives cases. 
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FIGURE 8:  ANY-MOTIVE 
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Whether this is a sound approach is plainly controversial. 
Can fires really be subdivided into portions?111 Can motives?112 
 
 111 I have used fires as my example to track the Restatement. But the Restatement 
also considers cases that may seem more intuitively divisible than a blaze. Consider a 
case of poisoning. Victim’s dinner has been dosed with slow-acting poison. Her three food 
items each contains 0.5 grams of Poison A. Her wine contains 0.5 grams of Poison B. An-
yone who receives a full gram of poison dies, and Victim dies. Did Poison B cause 
Victim’s death? Arguably, the answer is no: there was Poison A enough for the job, which 
is to say that there was a causally sufficient set that excludes Poison B and regards it as 
superfluous. Then again, it is just as true to say that Poison B paired with a dose of 
Poison A to kill Victim, rendering two doses of Poison A irrelevant. There is a causally 
sufficient set to which Poison B is essential. There is no principled way to say which of 
these two descriptions is the “true” causal description, so Poison B must be regarded as a 
cause of the death. Analogously, Motive-B must be regarded as a cause of the motivated 
action. 
 112 Motives are complex, but it should be intuitive that they are at least partially 
subdividable. An employer’s A-Motive likely grows by some amount when the employee 
is absent from work or tenders poor service. The total A-Motive is in some sense the 
product of discrete experiences. When a mixed-motives employer has ample A-Motive, 
we might also say that some portion of those negative experiences generated a level of 
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Are there really hard lines, a sliver below which the house is 
preserved or the employee retained? These are bold positions to 
stake out, so it is understandable why the Restatement noted 
the possibility and neither endorsed nor rejected it. Still, regard-
less of whether one is persuaded that the Any-Motive standard 
is a better fit for causation than the Causal-Motive standard, it 
should be clear that either is a better fit than the But-For 
standard.113 
While reasonable minds can differ over the wisdom of allow-
ing motive-causation with less than a But-For standard, it is 
baffling that so many commentators assume that a But-For 
standard draws any support from principles of causation. The 
US Supreme Court is one body that has alternated in its aware-
ness of this problem. 
Despite unanimously accepting a causation requirement in 
employment discrimination mixed-motives cases, in half a dozen 
mixed-motives cases, the Supreme Court has nevertheless split 
over and over on what exactly that requirement entails. In Price 
Waterhouse v Hopkins,114 the plurality accepted multiple causa-
tion,115 with the dissent insisting on only but-for causation.116 All 
subsequent decisions have flipped. Therefore, some courts inter-
preting employment discrimination cases may be bound to im-
plement causation as but-for causation. But future courts should 
take heed of how little constraint a proper causation analysis ac-
tually imposes on mixed-motives analysis. 117 
 
justified hostility that combined with a low level of B-Motive to cause the action and that 
the additional justified hostility was causally superfluous. 
 113 This observation comports with ordinary usage. A recent paper used surveys to 
determine what Americans thought “causation” entailed. See generally James A. 
Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory Experimentation, 94 
Ind L J *4 (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author): 
[S]ome alternative causation standards [such as the Causal-Motive and Any-
Motive standards] rejected by the Court come much closer to tracking ordinary 
usage (and, independently, assessments of moral blameworthiness) than does 
the Court’s “but-for” test. . . . Specifically, the “substantial factor” standard 
[akin to the Causal-Motive standard] for causation comes much closer to track-
ing common sense and statutory causality attribution than does the “but-for” 
test. 
While there may be limits to the utility of such data, it does go to confirm that the court’s 
preference for but-for causation is not justified by ordinary usage. 
 114 490 US 228 (1989). 
 115 Id at 242–45 (Brennan) (plurality); id at 260 (White concurring). 
 116 Id at 281 (Kennedy dissenting); id at 262 (O’Connor concurring). 
 117 For example, Professor Deborah DeMott has worked to avoid use of But-For cau-
sation in fiduciary litigation. Deborah A. DeMott, Causation in the Fiduciary Realm, 91 
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* * * 
A causal argument for the But-For standard finds little 
support in history, statutory text, or tort principles. Despite all 
the problems, but-for causation arguments remain in circula-
tion. Why? It may be because causation was only a stand-in for 
certain policy arguments, such as freedom from intrusion or 
avoidance of windfalls. We turn now to these policy arguments 
to see whether there is anything worth vindicating through mo-
tives analysis. 
III.  FREEDOM 
The But-For standard is supposed to be the antidote to two 
closely related worries about motives analysis: excessive con-
straint and excessive intrusiveness. Responding to both, the 
But-For standard is meant to ensure defendants a measure of 
freedom. 
Yet to whatever degree the law seeks to create safe harbors, 
it should do so in a way that is logical. By contrast, a But-For 
motive standard is not needed to prevent the worst impositions 
on freedom, nor is it successful in preventing the ordinary ones. 
A. Blocked Action 
Analyzing motives means that some otherwise legitimate 
actions might be blocked because of the mental state of the deci-
sionmaker.118 For example, a city with a severe budgetary crisis 
might be unable to close costly amenities if its city council at 
the time happened to harbor additional (bigoted) reasons to 
close the amenities.119 This Section first introduces several such 
 
BU L Rev 851, 865–66 (2011) (explaining that a fraud victim’s reliance establishes cau-
sation “although ‘his reliance on the truth of the fraudulent misrepresentation [was not] 
the sole or even the predominant or decisive factor in influencing his conduct.’”), citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 546, cmt b (1977). 
 118 This is a specific legal example of a general problem arising out of moral philoso-
phy’s “double effect” literature. See generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, Physician-Assisted 
Suicide: Two Moral Arguments, 109 Ethics 497 (1999). See also T.M. Scanlon, Moral 
Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, and Blame 19, 20–21 (Belknap 2008). Professor 
Micah Schwartzman calls the blocked action problem the “permissibility objection,” 
which he then criticizes with respect to the travel ban discussed in this Section. See gen-
erally Micah Schwartzman, Official Intentions and Political Legitimacy: The Case of the 
Travel Ban (University of Virginia School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research 
Paper No 2018-22, Apr 2018). 
 119 See Palmer v Thompson, 403 US 217 (1971). Certain facts about the case make 
it hard to take Palmer’s blocked action problem at face value. Id at 229 (Blackmun 
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examples and how they have worried scholars and jurists. I then 
explain why these worries need not be decisive: it is possible to 
calibrate remedies to avoid blocking action, and a serious com-
mitment to this objection would prove too much—concern for 
blocked action leads not to the But-For standard but to an aban-
donment of motive jurisprudence altogether. 
But first: a majority of the justices in Palmer v Thompson120 
took the problem of blocked action quite seriously.121 Cities must 
have the power to close pools that they cannot afford even if city 
leaders’ ulterior motives are not admirable.122 Although the 
Palmer Court rejected motive analysis altogether, it is easy to 
consider the But-For standard as a compromise, guaranteeing 
that defendants can always do what they know is right even if 
tainted by some bad motives too. 
For a contemporary application, consider the current presi-
dential administration’s Travel Ban. One week after taking office, 
President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order 13769,123 
which halted entry by individuals from seven predominantly 
Muslim countries124 and constrained admission of refugees.125 
 
concurring) (noting that “[n]o other municipal recreational facility in the city of Jackson 
has been discontinued”). 
 120 403 US 217 (1971). 
 121 Id at 227; id at 228 (Burger concurring); id at 230 (Blackmun concurring) (find-
ing petitioner’s response “disturbing”). Similar concerns were important in Mt. Healthy, 
429 US at 286 (“A borderline or marginal candidate . . . ought not to be able . . . to pre-
vent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to 
rehire on the basis of that record.”) (emphases added). 
 122 Palmer, 403 US at 227 (“[C]ities could be forced . . . to construct or refurbish 
swimming pools which they choose not to operate for any reason, sound or unsound.”). 
Justice Harry Blackmun likewise feared that the city would “be ‘locked in’ with its pools 
for an indefinite time in the future, despite financial loss of whatever amount, just be-
cause at one time the pools of Jackson had been segregated.” Id at 230 (Blackmun con-
curring). Counsel for the plaintiff agreed with the lock-in argument. Id, citing Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 43–44 (“A. If the question is, are they locked in forever because of 
racial problems which cause a rise in economic difficulties in operating the pool, my an-
swer is that they would be locked in.”). 
 Justice Burger took a forward-looking perspective, anticipating how other cities may 
respond: “[Any holding that] constitutionally ‘locks in’ the public sponsor so that [the 
service or facility] may not be dropped . . . would plainly discourage the expansion and 
enlargement of needed services in the long run.” Id at 228 (Burger concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
 123 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 82 
Fed Reg 8977 (2017) (Order 1). The executive orders were issued pursuant to 8 USC 
§ 1182(f). 
 124 Order 1 at § 3(c). 
 125 Id at § 5(a)–(d). In the face of litigation, the president later enacted a second 
order, placing similar restrictions on immigration but with greater discussion of the 
764 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:725 
 
These were arguably mixed-motive orders. On the one hand, 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said of the second 
order that it “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and dis-
crimination.”126 On the other hand, the orders offered numerous 
national security rationales.127 As a result of challenges under, 
inter alia, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
federal district courts issued nationwide preliminary injunctions 
against both executive orders, which their respective courts of 
appeals affirmed.128 
If we accept a simplified version of these facts,129 we confront 
a mixed-motives case with a serious blocked action problem. If 
issued by another president, the orders might save lives, but 
they are illegal because of the animus of this president. 
Numerous commentators have raised this worry. For exam-
ple, Professor Eric Posner has argued that motive-based chal-
lenges endanger Americans: 
[T]his extra layer of judicial review will burden Trump even 
when he acts with a national security justification—like 
 
national security objectives of the policy. Executive Order 13780, Protecting the Nation 
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 82 Fed Reg 13209 (2017) (Order 2). 
 126 International Refugee Assistance Project v Trump, 857 F3d 554, 572 (4th Cir 
2017). The orders were presaged by numerous statements—by Trump and others—
reflecting a desire to target Muslims for restricted entry. Id at 594–95. 
 127 The orders purported to justify the ban by citing problems with the past and pre-
sent visa regime, Order 1 at § 1, 82 Fed Reg at 8977, a need for immediate review of our 
immigration policies, Order 1 at § 3(a), (b), (h), 82 Fed Reg at 8978, and the prevalence of 
“hostile attitudes” and “violent ideologies” in the subject countries, Order 1 at § 1. See 
also Order 2 at § 1 (d), 82 Fed Reg at 13210 (“Each of these countries is a state sponsor of 
terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains ac-
tive conflict zones.”). 
 128 Washington v Trump, 2017 WL 462040, *2 (WD Wash), affd, 847 F3d 1151, 1167 
(9th Cir 2017) (per curiam) (regarding Order 1); International Refugee Assistance Project 
v Trump, 241 F Supp 3d 539, affd in part, revd in part, 857 F3d 554 (4th Cir 2017), vacd 
and remd, 138 S Ct 353 (2017) (regarding Order 2). The Supreme Court recently af-
firmed the newest version of the travel ban. Trump v Hawaii, 138 S Ct 2392 (2018). 
 129 The real travel bans elicited doubts about the sincerity of purported national se-
curity rationales. At the District Court of Maryland, plaintiffs cited a Homeland Security 
report and an affidavit by former senior security officials arguing that the executive or-
der served no security function and would even undermine security. International 
Refugee Assistance Project, 241 F Supp 3d at 548, 561–62. Likewise, continued state-
ments by Trump seemed to undermine his own security claims. See, for example, 
@realDonaldTrump (Twitter, June 5, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/R58L-STMN; 
Matt Zapotosky, Trump’s Latest Tweets Will Probably Hurt Effort to Restore Travel Ban 
(Wash Post, June 5, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/B3PF-JVLY. Still, there are those 
who would defend the orders on national security grounds. See, for example, Hans A. von 
Spakovsky, Trump Travel Ban Decision: Politics, Not the Law, in the 4th Circuit (Fox 
News Opinion, May 28, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Z2CH-LV68. 
2019] The Failure of Mixed-Motives Jurisprudence 765 
 
when Obama ordered extra vetting of Iraqi refugees in 
2011. While a court might not ultimately block Trump from 
acting, a [temporary restraining order] will always be a real 
possibility, which means that a necessary measure for our 
safety may be blocked. We may have a new regime of 
heightened judicial review in national security cases be-
cause courts believe the president is a bigot. This has never 
happened in all of American history. The country is less safe 
as a consequence.130 
Given a bigoted president, an expansive motive standard 
makes every security-related act potentially invalid, regardless 
of importance.131 
Posner does not quite call for a But-For standard, but it is 
understandable why others would think such a standard would 
defuse some of the trouble of blocked action.132 If the president 
 
 130 Eric Posner, The Presidency Shrinks (EricPosner.com, Feb 9, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/TMV8-CX3D. For a law professor with an even stronger stance on the 
matter, see Eugene Kontorovich, Opinion: The 9th Circuit’s Dangerous and Unprecedented 
Use of Campaign Statements to Block Presidential Policy (Wash Post, Feb 9, 2017), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/3EEE-7WSV: 
The states’ argument is in essence that Trump is a bigot, and thus his winning 
presidential campaign in fact impeaches him from exercising key constitutional 
and statutory powers, such as administering the immigration laws. This would 
mean that Trump is automatically disbarred, from the moment of his inaugu-
ration, of exercising certain presidential powers. 
 131 But see Aziz v Trump, 234 F Supp 3d 724, 737 (ED Va 2017) (denying that the 
court’s ruling would “render every policy that the president makes related to Muslim-
majority countries open to challenge”). Indeed, the Trump v Hawaii dissenters’ opinions 
do not just assess the evidence of animus differently than the majority: they use different 
motive rules. Justice Sonia Sotomayor seems to apply a Primary-Motive standard. 
Trump v Hawaii, 138 S Ct at 2438 (Sotomayor dissenting): 
Rather, the dispositive and narrow question here is whether a reasonable ob-
server, presented with all “openly available data,” the text and “historical con-
text” of the Proclamation, and the “specific sequence of events” leading to it, 
would conclude that the primary purpose of the Proclamation is to disfavor 
Islam and its adherents by excluding them from the country. 
Justice Breyer presumes an Any-Motive standard. Id at 2429 (Breyer dissenting): 
If its promulgation or content was significantly affected by religious animus 
against Muslims, it would violate the relevant statute or the First Amendment 
itself. . . . If, however, its sole ratio decidendi was one of national security, then it 
would be unlikely to violate either the statute or the Constitution. Which is it? 
The applicable motive standard is largely dispositive of the result. 
 132 See, for example, Vikram David Amar and Alan E. Brownstein, The Complexities 
of a “Motive” Analysis in Challenging President Trump’s Executive Order regarding Entry 
to the United States (Justia, Mar 24, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2BRP-3CQL (“If 
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can show a meaningful good faith national security motive for 
an action, then the But-For standard would protect the action. 
Thus, we need not wait for a less bigoted president in order to 
protect national security. 
As another example, Professor Richard Fallon argues for 
some caution in motive analysis because “few would judge it tol-
erable for courts to strike down a law prohibiting murder if his-
torical examination revealed that most members of the legisla-
ture voted for it solely for the constitutionally forbidden purpose 
of enforcing one of God’s commandments. The consequences 
would be too draconian.”133 
Yet the effects are draconian only if laws are actually struck 
down and they stay struck down. The main fallacy with the 
blocked action argument is that it conflates liability with a par-
ticular remedy: permanent injunction of an action or overturn-
ing of a statute. But an effective motive jurisprudence can cali-
brate its remedy to avoid blocking vital actions. 
First, a motive-based remedy could be temporally bounded 
to accommodate later changes in motive.134 A legislature whose 
law is blocked because of its bad motive can repass the law when 
its motives are demonstrably pure. A defendant that takes heed 
of the legal effect of motive will have good reason to adjust its 
motives ahead of time to avoid judicial trouble. 
Can defendants easily change their motives to dynamically 
minimize the cost of blocked action? In many cases, the answer 
is yes. Legislators can abstain from votes when their motives are 
unlawful. For an aggregate entity, it is often quite feasible to re-
shuffle personnel to achieve an acceptable motive structure. 
And knowing that these shuffles might take place gives in-
dividuals a reason to look within and attempt the hard work of 
addressing their own motives. If a boss’s bias creates liability 
risks for her firm anytime she takes action, then her motives are 
a career liability. If a legislator must abstain on key votes, lest 
the law be invalidated, her constituents may take notice. If the 
law puts a price on bad motives, individuals may do whatever 
 
any established impermissible intent ended up not being a ‘but for’ cause of the executive 
order, then it should not be a basis of invalidation.”). 
 133 Richard H. Fallon Jr, Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 Harv L 
Rev 523, 531 (2016). 
 134 By contrast, Professor Brandon Garrett accepts that “government actors may be 
forbidden from carrying out their policies, and for quite some time” in order to restore the 
state’s legitimacy. Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 105 
Va L Rev *5 (forthcoming 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/DR9D-59WU. 
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they can to adjust their motives or else be replaced by those who 
have done so. 
Nor need the remedy be even a temporary injunction or in-
validation of an action. When we wish to avoid constraint but 
still think that the behavior warrants regulation or liability, we 
can apply a comparatively small penalty: paying a fine, an 
award of attorneys’ fees, or even just a declaratory judgment. A 
defendant may deem this consequence sufficiently small that 
she will still take the action in question. 
We do this in the law frequently, setting penalties at a level 
that many defendants will be willing to pay.135 The penalty im-
posed can be used just as a benchmark to separate low-value 
acts from high-value acts, or it can be used to actually fund 
compensation to victims. This can be true even when wealth is 
not the thing transferred. A largely dignitary harm might lead to 
a largely dignitary remedy. Granting the plaintiff a declaratory 
judgment and attorneys’ fees may be important for encouraging 
suits, empowering individuals, vindicating rights, and express-
ing the law’s solidarity. 
When the plaintiff’s dignity and the defendant’s freedom are 
both important, we can protect a measure of both.136 We already 
grant attorneys’ fees and related remedies to Title VII discrimina-
tion victims even when discrimination was not a but-for cause of 
their termination. What about a similar remedy for the travel ban 
orders? Individuals excluded from entry under the orders would 
receive financial compensation for their jarring time holed up at 
an airport in recognition of (and to discourage) the bigotry in-
volved in creating the orders. But Order 2 stands, and (by hypoth-
esis) the important national security goals are still effectuated.137 
 
 135 One familiar variant on this approach is to set penalty levels as “liability rules,” 
which compensate the victim, as opposed to the more stringent “property rules,” which are 
protected with penalties too costly for defendants to rationally accept. See generally Guido 
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972). See also Richard A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law 57 (Little, Brown 1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of 
Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 Rutgers L Rev 273, 292 (1970) 
(introducing the notion that the law should encourage efficient breach). 
 136 For example, Garrett would block badly motivated government acts in order to 
safeguard the state’s legitimacy. See Garrett, 105 Va L Rev at *28–39 (cited in note 134) 
Perhaps the state can restore its legitimacy merely by penalizing the acts of some de-
fendants without outright preventing their conduct. 
 137 I do not wish to be glib about this suggestion. There are reasons to resist a re-
gime in which government actors may violate the Constitution whenever they are willing 
to spend the taxpayers’ money afterward. But this tentative suggestion does not pre-
sume that it is actually okay to violate core rights in exchange for a token payment; it is 
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Relatedly, a tough remedy (say, invalidation) can allow the 
putatively important action while encouraging defendants to 
take steps to affirm the dignity of victims. For example, an ad-
ministration that makes anti-Muslim statements faces credibil-
ity problems in asserting that its travel ban is not meant to dis-
criminate based on religion; its case gets better if officials 
apologize about or repudiate past statements. These reparative 
steps arguably do some good for the victims of the ban, whose 
victimization might otherwise go unanswered by officials in the 
process of unblocking the action.138 
Another nonblocking remedy is for the motive inquiry to end 
not in a determination of liability (or the striking down of a law) 
but simply a shift in judicial posture from prodefendant to pro-
plaintiff in subsequent stages of litigation. For example, courts 
normally abstain from interfering with the decisions of corporate 
directors.139 However, when directors’ motives are shown to be 
sufficiently tainted, things look different. The tainted decisions 
are not per se invalid, nor are tainted directors automatically li-
able; they simply lose the protection of the abstention doctrine, 
the business judgment rule. The litigation continues, now with 
the board having a burden to prove to the court that its conduct 
was entirely fair.140 If the conduct was entirely fair, and so was 
objectively the right action, the court will not block it or censure 
the board. Thus, a motive inquiry can proceed—under a stand-
ard other than the But-For standard—without any risk of block-
ing action. 
Likewise, many constitutional motive inquiries lead not to 
invalidation but instead to additional inquiries. Acts flunking a 
motive test may still be tolerated if the state can defend them 
under a strict scrutiny standard. This is true of Dormant 
 
instead an effort to imagine new imperfect solutions in tough cases when there may be 
no perfect solutions. 
 138 See International Refugee Assistance Project v Trump, 883 F3d 233, 268 (4th Cir 
2018) (“President Trump could have removed the taint of his prior troubling statements; 
for a start he could have ceased publicly disparaging Muslims.”) See also Schwartzman, 
Official Intentions at *22–23 (cited in note 118). I do not wish to overstate this argument. 
The actual travel ban was affirmed, though officials made only limited efforts to hide or 
undo evidence of B-Motives. Trump v Hawaii, 138 S Ct at 2439 (Sotomayor dissenting) 
(noting absence of disavowal). 
 139 See, for example, In re GSC, Inc, 453 Bankr 132, 173 (SDNY 2011). 
 140 See, for example, In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, 67 A3d 496, 500 (Del 
Chanc 2013). 
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Commerce Clause challenges to protectionist motives,141 Due 
Process Clause challenges to laws motivated to place an “undue 
burden” on abortion rights,142 Free Exercise Clause challenges to 
efforts to “infringe upon or restrict practices because of their re-
ligious motivation,”143 Establishment Clause challenges to pro-
moting religion,144 Equal Protection Clause challenges to racial 
discrimination,145 and other areas.146 For all these, the motive in-
quiry is only the first step. The action will not be blocked if it is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.147 
All of this is to say that we don’t need to altogether block a 
defendant’s conduct if she loses on a motive-based test. In many 
areas of law, we allow losers on a subjective test to defend them-
selves with facts supporting the objective appropriateness of 
their actions. Defendants don’t like having to defend themselves 
on these terms, nor do plaintiffs like having to go through one 
more step toward success, but such a compromise position is 
plainly available to resolve some of our most pressing concerns 
about blocked action. 
If a president’s executive order is vital for national security, 
the Department of Justice can defend it by establishing the ob-
jective importance of the law on a nondeferential standard. Con-
siderations of expertise, secrecy, and deference make this inap-
propriate in cases of unimpeached motives, but quite fitting 
when the defendant-executive has revealed problematic judg-
ment. As Fallon explains, the point of motive or intent analysis 
is not whether the legislature would have reached the same 
result absent an affirmatively forbidden purpose, but 
 
 141 See, for example, Wyoming v Oklahoma, 502 US 437, 454 (1992) (“This ‘negative’ 
aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism—that is, regulatory 
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state com-
petitors.”), quoting New Energy Co of Indiana v Limbach, 486 US 269, 273–74 (1988). 
See also City of Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617, 628 (1978) (condemning 
measures enacted “to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons”). 
 142 See, for example, Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833, 877 (1992) (plurality). 
 143 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Hialeah, 508 US 520, 533 (1993). 
 144 See, for example, Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 43, 56 (1985); Lemon v Kurtzman, 
403 US 602, 612 (1971). 
 145 See, for example, Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 240 (1976). 
 146 See, for example, Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 920 (1995) (race-based 
redistricting). 
 147 See, for example, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 US at 533. It is often 
said that “‘strict’ in theory [is] fatal in fact.” Gunther, 86 Harv L Rev at 8 (cited in note 
37). But see Winkler, 59 Vand L Rev at 796 (cited in note 37) (“30 percent of all applica-
tions of strict scrutiny [in federal courts] . . . result in the challenged law being upheld.”). 
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whether a court should defer to the legislature’s judgment 
that a challenged statute comports with constitutional 
norms. With regard to that question, the legislature’s 
breach of its deliberative obligations should bring deference 
to an end and, for reasons stated above, should provoke ele-
vated judicial scrutiny.148 
In this light, it is significant that each court reviewing the 
Executive Orders stressed the paucity of evidence of the actual 
security justification for the orders.149 
B. Intrusiveness 
Even if the law’s remedies are appropriately tailored to 
avoid blocking good actions, the mere act of scrutinizing a de-
fendant’s motives has its costs. When the defendant is a legisla-
ture or state actor, asking a defendant to prove its good motives 
may be an unacceptable intrusion on the independence of another 
branch or department.150 Legislators have privilege, and it is a 
worrisome thing to build doctrines that will frequently run up 
against that principle.151 Nongovernmental institutions like cor-
porations may retain rights to autonomous private ordering, re-
flecting America’s commitment to employer autonomy and dis-
cretion in labor markets.152 Employers need not worry about 
 
 148 Fallon, 130 Harv L Rev at 579 (cited in note 133). See also Richard L. Hasen, 
Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 Wis L Rev 843, 850. 
 149 Washington v Trump, 847 F3d at 1168; International Refugee Assistance Project, 
241 F Supp 3d at 562–63, affd, 857 F3d 554. 
 150 See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 NYU L Rev 1784, 
1809–10 (2008) (noting that courts have been more willing to scrutinize city counsel qua 
administrator than qua legislature). 
 151 US Const Art I, § 6, cl 1 (providing that “for any Speech or Debate in either 
House, [Senators or Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place”). This 
clause is to protect open deliberation and preserve the legislative branch’s independence. 
See United States v Brewster, 408 US 501, 525 (1972); Tribe, 1993 Sup Ct Rev at 16 n 34 
(cited in note 14) (noting the contribution of the Speech and Debate Clause). See also 
Brest, 1971 S Ct Rev at 128–29 (cited in note 14) (discussing intrusiveness concerns in 
Palmer); Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, 429 US 
252, 268 (1977) (“In some extraordinary instances the members [of Congress] might be 
called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action, 
although even then such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege.”). 
 152 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 242 (Brennan) (plurality) (stressing that one of 
Congress’s key concerns in passing Title VII was the “preservation of an employer’s re-
maining freedom of choice”). Congress sought to retain employment at will in its con-
struction of the Title VII discrimination regime. Id at 244–45. See also id at 239 
(“Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise 
preserving employers’ freedom of choice. This balance between employee rights and em-
ployer prerogatives turns out to be decisive.”). In forty-nine states, an employer is free to 
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having to defend actions performed with “mere discriminatory 
thoughts.”153 They are safe to make decisions without backseat 
drivers. Most generally, natural persons should not have to ex-
plain their every thought.154 
A But-For standard seems to protect such freedom because 
it protects defendants who can document a good motive, perhaps 
before dirty laundry is aired. Yet the standard does a poor job at 
creating a safe harbor against intrusion relative to other motive 
standards. Most obviously, the Sole-Motive test is a better test 
for preserving the defendant’s freedom because it exonerates de-
fendants every time a legitimate motive is present. Relative to 
that benchmark, a But-For standard leaves defendants highly 
vulnerable. 
If the Sole-Motive test is rejected, it must be because the 
law is seeking to balance the importance of both legitimate and 
illicit motives. When the law takes stock of two motives, it often 
does so by way of a Primary-Motive test. This test also allows 
some plaintiffs to prevail while still giving assurance to many 
defendants. Holding the But-For standard up against the 
Primary-Motive standard, the latter does a far better job in pro-
tecting defendants and giving them appropriate assurance. 
To compare the Primary-Motive standard and the But-For 
standard, let us consider some properties that a test would have 
if it were to give appropriate assurance to defendants, protecting 
their A-Motivated acts against intrusion. First, the test would 
generally not penalize increases in A-Motive because A-Motive 
is what the test is meant to protect. Second, a suitably protective 
test would give greater legal confidence to the wide swaths of 
relatively common and innocent cases. It should provide protec-
tion in questionable cases too, but privilege should weaken 
nearer its limit than its core. Third, the test should provide 
greatest protection when the risk of judicial error is highest; con-
versely, when the evidence will clearly bear out the defendant’s 
 
fire an employee for any reason or no reason—other than those reasons specifically 
barred by antidiscrimination law. The drafters of Title VII considered and rejected lan-
guage that seemed to impinge on employment at will. See id at 239 n 4. But see Cardi, 
75 Ohio St L J at 1145–50 (cited in note 75) (criticizing deference to employment at will). 
 153 But see Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 262 (O’Connor concurring) (rejecting a 
“mere discriminatory thoughts” standard). 
 154 See generally Gabriel S. Mendlow, Thoughts, Crimes, and Thought Crimes, 118 
Mich L Rev (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author); Gabriel S. Mendlow, Why Is It 
Wrong to Punish Thought?, 127 Yale L J 2342 (2018). 
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innocence, there is less need for a stridently prodefendant mo-
tive rule. 
The But-For standard flunks each of these conditions. 
First, between two individuals who differ only in their level 
of A-Motive, the one with higher levels of A-Motive should not be 
treated more harshly. Yet a But-For Standard does just this, 
and does so more often than competing tests. 
Consider Figure 9, which shows the liability region for a 
But-For standard. 
FIGURE 9:  A-RISK 
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An individual with a low level of A-Motive (Low-A) often es-
capes liability—she simply hasn’t taken any intentional action 
on the basis of A-Motive, and B-Motive was not enough to com-
plete the motivation package. But an otherwise identical indi-
vidual who nevertheless has higher levels of A-Motive could 
cross the threshold into the realm of hybrid cases. In fact, this 
remains a potential path to liability unless B-Motive increases 
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enough to put the combined motivation into the zone of sole de-
termination in Quadrant I. Anywhere in the starred region of 
Figure 10, the stars move up higher and closer to legal risk if A-
Motive rises. 
FIGURE 10:  BUT-FOR A-RISK 
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By contrast, a primary purpose test suffers this defect to a 
much lesser degree, as is clear from Figure 11.155 
 
 155 A Sole-Motive test never punishes a defendant for increasing quantities of A-
Motive because a safe harbor covers all mixed-motives actions. 
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FIGURE 11:  PRIMARY A-RISK 
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The Primary-Motive test endangers a rising A-Motive only if 
B-Motive is greater than 0.5. If B-Motive is less than 0.5, no in-
crease in A-Motive can result in liability because A-Motive will 
remain primary in all cases in which action is taken. 
Now compare the tests in terms of when they provide the 
most assurance to defendants that their lawful exercise of A-
Motive will not be interrupted. Recall that a logical test should 
provide ample protection in contexts applicable to most defend-
ants and the most innocent defendants; it would be perverse if a 
rule meant to protect A-Motive (while balancing some concern 
for B-Motive) were strongest right before defendants who are ac-
tually culpable and weakest in the heartland. Yet that is just 
what the But-For standard achieves. 
Consider the zones of relative protection for the two rules. 
Figure 12 depicts the But-For standard with a rectangular re-
gion, encompassing much of Quadrants II and III, shaded with 
vertical and horizontal lines. 
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FIGURE 12:  BUT-FOR RISK 
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This additional shading represents a realm of risk. In that 
realm, the But-For standard test does not produce liability, but 
risk remains that slightly erroneous fact-finding might lead to 
liability. The case is close enough that a factfinder or prosecutor 
is at a meaningful risk of misreading the motives. As is clear, 
the zone of risk disappears once A-Motive is high enough, but it 
does not vary with B-Motive. There is no risk that overstating B-
Motive could lead to liability, but there is always a risk that un-
derstating A could lead to liability. 
Contrast this to Figure 13, which shows the risky region for 
the Primary-Motive standard in stars. 
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FIGURE 13:  PRIMARY-MOTIVE RISK 
II
IIV
B-Motive
A-Motive
1
1
1
 
The Primary-Motive standard also leaves the defendant un-
certain in some cases, but under different circumstances. Unless 
both A-Motive is high and B-Motive is low, the defendant might 
be misconstrued as having a problematic motive combination. 
Now let us compare these two regions of risk. To see how 
they differ, let us eliminate the realms of actual liability; these 
plainly matter but have already been considered. Eliminate also 
the places where danger is the same. The remaining (and thus, 
different) regions are depicted in Figure 14. 
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FIGURE 14:  DIFFERENCE IN RISK 
B-Motive
A-Motive
DangerforBut  For
DangerforPrimary
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Both motive rules have distinctive realms in which the risk 
of liability is nontrivial, but it looks like the But-For standard 
creates a normatively more troubling realm of risk. For that 
test, the risky region is where B-Motive is low and A-Motive is 
moderate. Presumably this combination is rather common. For 
any given person, our starting guess should be that she has a 
moderate level of good reason for her acts and only a shadow of 
bad motive. Such people are at risk with the But-For standard 
because they are in the realm of risk that covers many of the 
most common and most innocent cases. 
It is also a region where evidentiary checks are less likely to 
control the risk. Because neither motive is high, there is likely to 
be a less than complete record by which the defendant can build 
her defensive case. At the margin, we would prefer that poten-
tial errors arise in areas where they can be dispelled by careful 
evaluation of the evidence rather than places where there is lit-
tle evidence either way. 
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The Primary-Motive standard also leaves a region of risk, 
but it is a preferable region in which to impose risk. In the 
starred region, A-Motive is high and B-Motive is medium-to-
high. This is probably a better region for risk from the ordinary 
defendant’s point of view. Most people don’t have high levels of 
B-Motive, making this region of protection useful to many people 
and making the region of risk less frightening to most people. 
And when A-Motive and B-Motive are both present, there is 
likely to be enough evidence of both for the defendant to assess 
and make her case. 
The point is not that the But-For standard should be re-
placed by the Primary-Motive standard: perhaps the latter 
standard is itself inferior to a third option in light of the goals 
and constraints for a given legal inquiry. For now, the point is 
simply that the But-For standard has withstood criticism largely 
because it has never been subject to comparison against its rele-
vant competitors. Nor is it self-evident that a motive rule should 
protect the defendant’s autonomy and freedom from intrusion; 
but if the law seeks to do so, it should do so in logical fashion ra-
ther than failing on its own terms. 
IV.  OVERCOMPENSATION 
Courts are reluctant to compensate plaintiffs without seeing 
that the defendant’s motives led to new harm. Otherwise, the 
plaintiff may be rewarded for misfortunes the law would nor-
mally have deemed noncompensable.156 For example, the Mt. 
Healthy Court was concerned that a judgment for Doyle might 
make the First Amendment a vehicle for grabbing job security. 
As an untenured teacher with serious professional deficiencies, 
Doyle was at risk. He then did something “dramatic and 
 
 156 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 249 (Brennan) (plurality). See also Geller v 
Markham, 481 F Supp 835, 841 (D Conn 1979): 
If relief were to be afforded every time age was considered, the effects would go 
well beyond the remedial designs of the drafters of the ADEA. Back pay would 
be awarded to those who never had a chance for the job. . . . While doing so 
would provide a strong deterrent against age discrimination, it would be a de-
terrent far in excess of the limited deterrent Congress intended. 
See also Texas v Lesage, 528 US 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam) (“Simply put, where a plain-
tiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible cri-
terion and it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision re-
gardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983.”). 
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perhaps abrasive” but also vaguely political.157 The Court wor-
ried that 
a decision not to rehire could place an employee in a better 
position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected conduct than he would have occupied had he done 
nothing.158 
Overcompensation can seemingly be avoided with a But-For 
standard.159 If the employee was sure to be fired anyway on the 
merits as the employer saw them, then the bad motives are argu-
ably harmless, so a But-For standard successfully bars recovery. 
Intuitive though it may be, there are reasons for doubt. 
Some of these problems are connected with the particular facts 
and arguments in Mt. Healthy, the case in which compensation 
was first cited as a justification for a But-For standard. Other 
problems are general difficulties with controlling windfalls 
through the But-For standard. 
A. Overcompensation from Mt. Healthy 
Mt. Healthy has become a touchstone for numerous areas of 
law, including employment and First Amendment. It is therefore 
sensible to ask whether Mt. Healthy’s reasoning can be sensibly 
extended to these other domains or was even sound on its own 
terms. 
1. Extrapolating compensation arguments to nonstrategic 
contexts. 
It is not clear that the compensation policies implicated by 
Mt. Healthy sensibly apply in other domains, such as First 
Amendment disputes. That is because the overcompensation ar-
gument in Mt. Healthy is largely motivated by concern for stra-
tegic action: employees may seek the protection of motive-based 
laws when termination seems imminent. 
The strategic-overcompensation argument for a But-For 
standard arises in the context of a particular type of public 
school dispute, in which we worry that undeserving employees 
 
 157 See Mt. Healthy, 429 US at 285. 
 158 Id. The compensation argument can also be viewed dynamically as providing op-
portunities for strategic action. An employee “ought not to be able, by engaging in such 
conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a 
decision not to rehire on the basis of that record.” Id at 286. 
 159 See id at 287 (adopting a “same decision” test—that is, a “But-For” test). 
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may opportunistically fabricate First Amendment suits to pro-
tect their jobs. Yet the But-For standard is also invoked when 
school districts eliminate books from school library for both good 
pedagogical reasons and in order to censor ideas.160 Is there any 
risk that authors of badly written books will fabricate First 
Amendment claims, perhaps by organizing political protests in-
tended to stoke the ire of library boards, in order to secure a po-
tential windfall? Courts should be cautious citing Mt. Healthy in 
areas in which the plaintiff is unlikely to act strategically. More 
generally, concern for harm and proportionate compensation is 
not essential in all areas of the law.161 
2. The uncertain relationship between compensation and 
the But-For standard in Mt. Healthy. 
Even if the reasoning of Mt. Healthy can be safely applied to 
other areas of law, it is not entirely clear how that reasoning 
linked overcompensation to the But-For standard. Mt. Healthy’s 
invocation of overcompensation as an argument for a But-For 
standard is mysterious because the Court does not explain the 
basis of its idea that overcompensation fits only with the But-
For standard, nor does it defend it. Indeed, what little we know 
about the idea’s genesis should caution against linking compen-
sation with a But-For standard. 
Mt. Healthy did not offer any authority for connecting com-
pensation with the But-For standard—the linkage occurs with-
out explanation or argument—but reviewing the litigant sub-
missions gives some hint as to its further provenance. In 1970, a 
student case note offered the following compensation argument: 
It is conceivable that a teacher might openly engage in ac-
tivities which, although controversial, are constitutionally 
protected, and thereby make it difficult for a school board to 
even attempt to terminate his employment despite the 
 
 160 See Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No 26 v Pico, 
457 US 853, 871–72 (1982). 
 161 Batson challenges to discriminatory jury strikes use a But-For standard, though 
it is strange to say that these challenges are about compensating the movant rather than 
vindicating the movant’s right to an impartial jury. 
 Whether a payment is taxed as income depends on the motive of the payer. If the 
payer had a subjective charitable motive, it is not taxable. If a recipient does not report 
income, and the giver turned out to have a noncharitable (that is, business) motive, 
would we say that the IRS was harmed? It seems more natural to say that the taxpayer 
did not pay enough, without reference to harm or compensation. 
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presence of unquestionably valid grounds for nonrenewal. 
This is expecially [sic] true in situations where school offi-
cials would be unable to candidly deny that the teacher’s 
“extra-curricular activities” played no part in their decision 
to deny reemployment. Therefore, it seems imperative that 
the improper motivation be the primary cause of nonrenewal 
before judicial relief is granted.162 
The student note plainly raised the overcompensation ar-
gument on grounds essentially identical to Mt. Healthy. 
Although the Court does not cite the student note, the school 
district quoted this passage in full in its brief, suggesting that 
the Court’s overcompensation idea was inspired by the anony-
mous note.163 
The reason that history matters here is that the first breath 
of the compensation argument for a But-For standard does not 
itself support a But-For standard. Instead, the student author 
urged a different test altogether. He or she would require im-
proper motive to be the “primary cause” of the termination.164 
This clearly tracks one of the But-For standard’s main competi-
tors—the Primary-Motive standard. 
In this, the school district was happy to assent, arguing that 
the Mt. Healthy case “exemplifies the test suggested by a com-
mentator.”165 Thus, while the Mt. Healthy Court endorses a But-
For standard on the basis of a windfall argument, both the stu-
dent note and the party brief that first introduced the windfall 
argument thought it led elsewhere than a But-For standard.  
The point of this discussion is not that the student author 
has privileged authority in drawing conclusions from his or her 
premises nor that the Primary-Motive test is superior to the 
But-For standard—though we shall see, in Part IV.B.3, that it 
does have some powerful merits in this context. However, it can 
be liberating to see that neither the inventor of the argument 
nor its proponent in litigation thought that it leads to a But-For 
standard, suggesting that actual arguments are required to 
 
 162 Note, Refusal to Rehire a Nontenure Teacher for a Constitutionally Impermissible 
Reason, 1970 Wis L Rev 162, 169, discussing Jones v Hopper, 410 F2d 1323 (10th Cir 
1969) (emphasis added). 
 163 Brief for Petitioner, Mt. Healthy School District Board of Education v Doyle, 
No 75-1278, *15 (US filed June 3, 1976) (Mt. Healthy Petitioner’s Brief). 
 164 Note, 1970 Wis L Rev at 169 (cited in note 162). 
 165 Mt. Healthy Petitioner’s Brief at *15 (cited in note 163). 
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make the case that the test follows from the objection. No such 
arguments appear in Mt. Healthy or elsewhere. 
B. Controlling Windfalls 
The foregoing Section disputes the applicability of Mt. 
Healthy’s compensation reasoning, while this Section now turns 
to the merits of that reason. In some cases, apparent overcom-
pensation is really just compensation. In other cases, a plaintiff-
friendly motive rule does indeed overcompensate, but a portion 
of overcompensation (or a windfall of some sort) may be inevita-
ble, and so the best a standard can do is minimize and allocate 
overcompensation—a task for which the But-For standard is 
poorly suited. 
1. Denying windfalls. 
In many cases, it is questionable whether we should regard 
the plaintiff as overcompensated, even if the defendant would 
certainly have taken the same action if only acceptable motives 
were considered.166 In particular, when motives constitute part 
of a larger action, a given act can take on harmful significance in 
light of inappropriate motives.167 When this occurs, the motive 
changes something, making it worse, even though it may not 
change anything physically. 
The transformative power of a mental state is familiar to 
lawyers.168 For example, a journalist’s untrue and provocative 
story about a public official is “pulp” unless paired with bad mo-
tives, in which case it becomes “defamation.”169 A boss’s firing 
 
 166 See Katz, 94 Georgetown L J at 524 (cited in note 15) (arguing that we should 
not regard such cases as involving a windfall). See also Part IV.A.2; Note, 1970 Wis L 
Rev at 169 (cited in note 162). 
 167 See Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630, 647 (1993) (“[R]eapportionment is one area in 
which appearances do matter.”). 
 168 See Lazar v Merchants’ National Properties, Inc, 45 Misc 2d 235, 518 (NY Sup 
1964) (describing how “[t]he purpose, maliciously, to inflict injury” can “transform a law-
ful act into an actionable wrong”) (emphasis added), affd, 23 AD2d 630 (NY App 1965). 
See also generally F.B. Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful 
Motive of the Actor, 18 Harv L Rev 411 (1905). 
 169 See generally Thomas Edward Powell II, Comment, The Truth Will Not Set You 
Free in Nebraska: Actual Malice and Nebraska’s “Truth plus Motive” Defense, 72 Neb L 
Rev 1236 (1993). See also New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 283 (1964) (requir-
ing actual malice to overcome constitutional privilege in stories about public figures). 
Note that the New York Times v Sullivan “actual malice” standard for First Amendment 
protection has been interpreted to only indirectly incorporate motives analysis insofar as 
spiteful motives may indicate actual malice. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc v 
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someone for no reason is “arbitrary,” but firing for race is “dis-
crimination.”170 With and without the motive, many facts are the 
same: the same number of people read the story, the same period 
of unemployment may be endured.171 Yet something is also dif-
ferent and seemingly more harmful.172 
Discrimination in particular has drawn ample commentary 
to locate the core of its wrongness.173 Is it that it reenacts and 
participates in practices of oppression?174 That it insults the in-
dividual?175 We may debate why motive changes those acts, and 
whether those transformations ought to count as compensable 
harms in a given case,176 but this important discussion matter is 
simply short-circuited when a But-For standard is adopted. 
 
Connaughton, 491 US 657, 667–68 (1989). We could count it as a weak proxy usage. See 
Part II.A.2–3. Related to “actual malice” is “express malice,” which is motive as constitu-
ent. Express malice is necessary to overcome qualified privilege in common law defama-
tion. See Nodar v Galbreath, 462 So 2d 803, 806 (Fla 1984). 
 170 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 265 (O’Connor concurring). 
 171 Id (“This Court’s decisions under the Equal Protection Clause have long recog-
nized that whatever the final outcome of a decisional process, the inclusion of race or sex 
as a consideration within it harms both society and the individual.”). 
 172 See Christine M. Korsgaard, Acting for a Reason, in Jonathan Dancy and 
Constantine Sandis, eds, Philosophy of Action: An Anthology 207, 210 (Wiley-Blackwell 
2015). For Kant, every action is composed of an act and a motive, and so it is impossible 
to evaluate any action without clarifying the motive. But see Marcia W. Baron, Kantian 
Ethics Almost without Apology 152 (Cornell 1995) (applying a Primary-Motive standard 
to Kantian analysis of mixed motives). 
 173 Even when no harms are alleged, ambiguous facts are patterned through motive. 
Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 
16 J L & Econ 193, 203–04 (1973). 
 174 See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317 (1987) (describing the symbolic 
content and context of discrimination). See also generally Michael Kent Curtis, Race as a 
Tool in the Struggle for Political Mastery: North Carolina’s “Redemption” Revisited 1870–
1905 and 2011–2013, 33 L & Inequality 53 (2015) (describing repeating patterns of race 
in oppression). 
 175 See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law 3 (Little, Brown 1881) (“[E]ven 
a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.”). The dignitary 
harm is greater in a kick (or, if you will, a battery) than a stumble. The pairing of the 
physical act with the mental state arguably enacts the kicker’s exemption from the moral 
community and denies the victim’s bodily autonomy. 
 176 Tort compensation for dignitary harms is unusual, but it does appear that this is 
a realm in which Congress envisioned it and courts have supplied it. For example, 
Supreme Court precedent does not allow employers to avoid liability altogether by show-
ing that the employee would have been fired anyway if the evidence supporting termina-
tion was acquired only after termination. McKennon v Nashville Banner Publishing Co, 
513 US 352, 360 (1995). The liability that remains, even after showing that the employee 
would have suffered the same result anyway, may recognize some lingering dignitary 
harm. This conclusion is supported by the difference in treatment between discrimina-
tion suits and other employment suits lacking the dignitary patina with respect to after-
acquired evidence. Most other actions allow robust use of such evidence, in many cases to 
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2. Accepting windfalls. 
In some cases, we may agree that there is overcompensation 
but also that it is a feature, not a bug. If plaintiffs face dispro-
portionate challenges in pursuing certain claims, then 
supracompensatory payouts may be necessary to optimize their 
incentives.177 Overcompensation also has a place in many 
schemes of private enforcement. An unemployed teacher may 
just want his job back, but his suit helps discipline government 
actors against First Amendment violations. A passed-over ac-
countant may just want her promotion, but her suit spurs em-
ployers to end bias in the workplace.178 Getting the right number 
of these suits to discipline defendants may entail giving plain-
tiffs more than they lost. 
This general principle is widely accepted in both private and 
public law,179 and it has likewise been suggested as an appropri-
ate consideration for the scope of a motive standard.180 
3. Apportioning windfalls. 
In many mixed-motives cases, it may be that the law must 
give someone a better deal than she deserves, it is just a ques-
tion of whom. In denying a “windfall” to plaintiffs, the But-For 
standard grants a “windfall” to the defendant.181 Otherwise com-
pensable and wrongful acts avoid liability when the defendant 
 
bar all remedies. See generally Stephen J. Humes, After Acquired Evidence of Employee’s 
Misconduct as Barring or Limiting Recovery in Action for Wrongful Discharge, 34 
ALR5th 699 (1995) (compiling case law on after acquired evidence). Other areas of the 
law are likewise resistant to recovery for abstract, unconventional harms. See, for exam-
ple, Memphis Community School District v Stachura, 477 US 299, 310 (1986) (holding 
that abstract “value” or “importance” of constitutional rights are not a permissible ele-
ment of compensatory damages in an action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871). 
 177 The employer alone has access to its own mental states. And employers may be 
more systematic in documenting their A-Motives than B-Motives. Human resources de-
partments can log employee problems with great specificity but are unlikely to canvass 
for B-Motives. Ex post overcompensation may yet be appropriate ex ante compensation 
when those challenges are considered. 
 178 See Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to 
Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 NC L Rev 495, 532 (1990). 
 179 See Richard H. Fallon Jr and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1731, 1736 (1991); Wells, 51 Mercer L Rev at 
588–89 (cited in note 66). 
 180 See Weber, 68 NC L Rev at 531 (cited in note 178) (“Imposing remedies even 
when other causes would have had the same result increases deterrence by raising the 
likelihood of sanction.”). 
 181 See Katz, 94 Georgetown L J at 542 (cited in note 15). 
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locates an additional acceptable motive.182 In a discrimination 
case, a blatant and invidious instance of deliberate bigotry es-
capes justice if the defendant can produce a sufficient work-
related reason to fire the employee. In a market manipulation 
case, a member of a notorious rat pack of traders can escape lia-
bility for her actual and intended market abuse if she can pro-
duce an additional investment rationale for the abusive trade. 
The market injury occurs, by design, but goes uncompensated 
because the defendant also “liked the stock.”183 
In all cases in Quadrant II, where both motives are individ-
ually sufficient, the plaintiff appears overcompensated for recov-
ering despite the defendant’s bad motive, but the defendant also 
appears to enjoy good fortune despite her actionable mental 
state. The But-For standard apportions all windfalls to the de-
fendant, who escapes liability for an otherwise actionable act-
motive pair. The But-For standard does not actually reduce the 
magnitude or frequency of windfalls. 
In fact, there is no liability rule that can stop windfalls.184 
The best we can do is apportion the windfall to reduce its magni-
tude or improve the justice or efficiency of its distribution. We 
might think that it is appropriate to award the windfall to the 
party whose conduct came closest to blameless, as measured by 
motives. Then there would still be a plausibly unjust windfall, 
but it would be the better of the two options. 
If deeply bigoted employers paid a windfall to their employ-
ees, but slightly bigoted employers retained the windfall of im-
munity, it might strike us that windfall is being apportioned in 
keeping with desert. Likewise, if employers pay a windfall when 
their acceptable motive is quite weak, but they retain the wind-
fall when their acceptable motive loomed quite large for them, 
then it would give the windfall more often to the employers for 
whom acceptable motives are more important.185 Figure 15 
 
 182 See, for example, Bibbs v Block, 778 F2d 1318, 1327 (8th Cir 1985) (Lay concur-
ring) (“[T]he employer should not be able to exculpate its proven invidious discriminatory 
practices by having a second chance to show that racial considerations did not affect the 
decision’s outcome.”). 
 183 United States v Mulheren, 938 F2d 364, 367 (2d Cir 1991). 
 184 Nor can rules adjusting remedies reduce windfalls. For example, if we deem a 
defendant only 50 percent responsible when both she and another individual inde-
pendently contribute to a fire, we can discount the defendant’s liability by half. Relative 
to full recovery, the plaintiff’s windfall is reduced. But relative to full recovery, the de-
fendant’s windfall is increased. 
 185 Similar comparisons could be applied in other domains. Consider the mixed-
motives market manipulator. We might consider it better to convict an inveterate 
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visually depicts this intuition by using dotted lines to depict the 
strength of the A-Motive and dashed lines to show the B-Motive. 
X is an individual with much more significant B-Motive than A-
Motive. Holding her liable gives her no credit for her A-Motive, 
potentially compensating a plaintiff in an amount roughly indi-
cated by the vertical dotted line, but this is far less than the 
windfall X would obtain if exempted from liability: she would es-
cape any consequences for her much greater B-Motive (indicated 
by the horizontal dashed line). In other words, better that the 
shorter vertical line be allocated as windfall than the longer hor-
izontal line. Examination of Y’s motives yields the opposite con-
clusion. The Primary-Motive test sorts individuals accordingly, 
apportioning the windfall wherever it is smallest. 
FIGURE 15:  APPORTIONING WINDFALLS 
Y
X
B-Motive
A-Motive
1
1
1
 
This method of limiting and allocating windfalls alleviates 
the most uncomfortable cases. Imagine a boss fires an employee 
who literally never works; even if the boss’s B-Motive was large 
enough to independently drive the firing, the plausibly enor-
mous A-Motive makes it seem unjust for the employee to recover 
 
market sharper despite her relatively minor investment motive while exonerating a 
mostly scrupulous investor who succumbs in part to a manipulative motive for action. 
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despite her dereliction. Conversely, an unrepentant and brazenly 
racist boss who fires someone with a string of bigoted epithets 
probably ought to lose a Title VII suit even though the employee 
missed enough work to be fired.186 Yes, the employee is treated 
better than other absentee employees fired that day, but this 
seems like the less unjust windfall.187 
This alternative approach, which allocates the windfall in 
light of the relative strength of the relevant motives, should 
prove particularly attractive to those who remain invested in 
analogies to tort law and theory. When the defendant’s negli-
gence was only one cause of the plaintiff’s injury, there is an 
analogous windfall to allocate: either a culpable defendant es-
capes because of a concurrent cause, or a plaintiff recovers from 
the defendant despite other individuals (including, perhaps, the 
plaintiff herself) having contributed to the injury. The majority 
rule is to give the windfall to whomever was least responsible for 
the outcome: if the plaintiff (or a third party) was most at fault, 
the plaintiff does not recover from the defendant; if the defendant 
was the most responsible, then the plaintiff recovers in full.188 
The logic of using a Primary-Motive test in apportioning 
windfalls is not a novel idea.189 Recall that this solution predates 
the windfall problem itself. Though the windfall problem was 
born in Mt. Healthy, its embryo was probably a 1970 student 
note,190 which was cited in Mt. Healthy’s appellate brief.191 That 
 
 186 See Gudel, 70 Tex L Rev at 108 (cited in note 50). 
 187 This is roughly analogous to tort law’s treatment of comparative negligence. See 
note 188. This approach might also improve incentives: Fear of paying a windfall gives 
an incentive to reduce bigoted attitudes in the employer. Fear of losing the windfall gives 
the employee a reason to be utterly professional, to reduce the legitimate motive for ter-
mination. Both actors gain an incentive to improve her conduct because neither has a 
safe harbor. 
 188 The majority rule is some form of modified comparative negligence. Many states 
implement this rule by also reducing recovery for partially responsible plaintiffs. See 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 7 (2000) (providing that, 
when plaintiff is partially responsible for injury, damages can be reduced). Such a modi-
fication of recovery is also possible under the Primary-Motive rule. 
 The approach preferred by academics is to allow the plaintiff to recover regardless of 
its level of relative responsibility but to simply reduce recovery accordingly. This is the 
Pure Comparative Fault regime. Such an approach could be adopted in employment 
too—allowing recovery under Any-Motive but then reducing it according to some as-
sessment of responsibility, including the presence of A-Motive. 
 189 Professor Mark Weber offers a similar suggestion by incorporating dispropor-
tionate hardship. Weber, 68 NC L Rev at 521 (cited in note 178). If an employer would be 
forced to rehire an employee despite her utter lack of qualifications, then the hardship of 
a reinstatement remedy is disproportionate. 
 190 Note, 1970 Wis L Rev at 169 (cited in note 162), discussing Jones, 410 F2d 1323. 
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note urged adoption of a Primary-Motive standard to deal with 
windfalls.192 
If we regard it as a windfall whenever the law gives a party 
something it would not have gotten had the other motive been 
considered, then windfalls are inevitable. Yet the But-For 
standard is far from the only or best way of apportioning these 
windfalls. The Primary-Motive standard also apportions wind-
falls, and with seemingly better justice and efficiency effects. 
The point is not that the Primary-Motive standard is the 
best test in every case or in all respects.193 It is just that a failure 
to consider an alternative standard, such as the Primary-Motive 
standard, shows the incompleteness of windfall arguments in 
favor of the But-For standard. 
V.  OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE BUT-FOR STANDARD 
While the foregoing Part criticizes the positive case for the 
But-For standard, it criticizes the But-For standard itself only 
obliquely by pointing out that it lacks the justification commonly 
attributed to it. This Part goes further, identifying problems 
with the standard that should give pause even to those who 
passed through Part III unpersuaded. 
A. Stability 
The But-For standard is unstable and threatens collapse 
sub rosa into one of the other standards because it is highly sen-
sitive to the court’s definition of the action to be analyzed. 
Courts can scale up or scale down the granularity of analysis of 
the action. The standard therefore offers little guidance or con-
straint to courts looking for a principled way to address motive 
analysis. 
Defining the action granularly can help a plaintiff. A highly 
granular analysis asks whether any aspect of the action changed 
 
 191 Mt. Healthy Petitioner’s Brief at *15 (cited in note 163). 
 192 Note, 1970 Wis L Rev at 169 (cited in note 162), discussing Jones, 410 F2d 1323. 
 193 A Primary-Motive test finds for the defendant when the good motive was prima-
ry but the bad motive was nevertheless necessary to motivate the action. It therefore ac-
quits in some cases in which the plaintiff’s protected status was a but-for factor in her 
adverse treatment. That may be an unacceptable result in some areas of the law. If so, 
other options can be considered. In other work, I will discuss at greater length a com-
pound rule, which I call the Pivotal-Motive rule, that finds for the plaintiff whenever bad 
motive was primary or necessary. Thus, under the Pivotal-Motive rule, the plaintiff pre-
vails should she satisfy either a But-For standard or a Primary-Motive standard. 
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as a result of bad motive. For example, did the defendant act at 
a slightly different time as a result of the bad motive? Then we 
have a different harm that can be attributed to the motive, and 
the But-For standard is in some sense satisfied—even though in 
another sense, the conduct was bound to happen anyway, just a 
moment sooner or later. And when acts are examined pixel-by-
pixel, even tiny levels of bad motive might satisfy a But-For 
standard. And therefore, the But-For standard reaches into an 
Any-Motive standard.194 
A low granularity test might acknowledge and disregard 
certain allegedly different acts and results traceable to the mo-
tive so long as the gravamen of the act or harm remained the 
same as would have occurred anyway. By taking a wider view, 
the bad motive’s effects blur away. Only a deeply bad motive, 
the sort that would satisfy a Primary-Motive test for example, 
can predictably survive a wider standard. 
For example, consider a case in which a broker was accused 
of market manipulation.195 Assume that she had ample legiti-
mate reasons to buy the stock in question for her client so that 
bad motives may not have been a but-for cause of her disruptive 
purchase.196 A court seemingly could not convict such defendants 
on a But-For standard.197 Nevertheless, the defendant might 
have “engaged in trades at particular times, and in particular 
amounts, because of . . . [a] manipulative scheme.”198 In other 
words, she might have bought the stock even without a bad mo-
tive, but she might not have bought a particular share at a par-
ticular moment but for the bad motive. It is easy to bypass a 
 
 194 On the proper degree of conceptual separation, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, 
Accidents and Aggregates, 59 Wm & Mary L Rev 2371 (2018). See also generally Lee 
Anne Fennell, Slices and Lumps (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No 395 
2d Series, Mar 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/C2AM-T35B. 
 195 This example is based on Securities and Exchange Commission v Kwak, 2008 WL 
2705417 (D Conn). Two brokers were accused of manipulating the price of securities 
bought for themselves and their clients. 
 196 See, for example, Joe Nocera, Chasing Small Fry, S.E.C. Let Madoff Get Away 
(NY Times, June 26, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/9T54-U9ST (describing facts of 
Kwak, including how the defendants viewed the underlying company as “the road to 
riches” and never sold its stock, even at its highest price). 
 197 See, for example, Defendant Stephen J. Wilson’s Reply in Support of Renewed 
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Securities and Exchange Commission v 
Competitive Technologies, 2008 WL 62818, *9–10 (D Conn filed Jan 17, 2008) (Wilson 
Brief) (making this argument and citing Securities and Exchange Commission v Masri, 
523 F Supp 2d 361, 372–73 (SDNY 2007)). 
 198 Kwak, 2008 WL 410427 at *4 n 10 (emphasis altered). See Andrew Verstein, 
Benchmark Manipulation, 56 BC L Rev 215, 263–64 (2015) (advocating this approach). 
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But-For standard in market manipulation cases because “that 
theory loses its applicability if the prohibited intent alters the 
trade in any material respect (e.g. by changing the time at which 
the trade would otherwise have been executed).”199 
Courts use similar divide-and-inquire strategies in other con-
texts, such as redistricting cases,200 in which the battle is often 
fought by defining the scope of the inquiry. In Miller v Johnson,201 
the Court located bad motives in a mixed-motives redistricting 
case by zeroing in on the rationale for particular stretches of dis-
trict boundary. “The State admitted that it ‘would not have added 
those portions of Effingham and Chatham Counties . . . [to the] 
Eleventh Congressional District but for the need to include addi-
tional black population.’”202 Indeed, for some spots, “race was 
clearly the sole objective behind its creation.”203 The Court re-
cently explicitly endorsed the granular approach in Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus v Alabama,204 overruling a district 
court that had judged the motives for the districting plan “as a 
whole.”205 
 
 199 Kwak, 2008 WL 410427 at *4 n 10. 
 200 Redistricting cases are probably not using But-For standards. See generally 
Verstein, 127 Yale L J 1106 (cited in note 24). But the jurisprudence is not fully settled 
and certain strands of the But-For standard often emerge. One fixture of redistricting 
law has been the shifting role of alternative maps. In Easley v Cromartie, 532 US 234, 
249 (2001), the Court seemed to endorse a requirement that plaintiffs must present an 
alternative district map in order to vindicate their claims against the challenged map. If 
no alternative map can be produced, then it may suggest that the legislature could not 
have done any better by fixing its motives. 
 The more recent Cooper v Harris case rejected that requirement, clarifying that such 
a map would be helpful but is not the only path to success. Cooper, 137 S Ct 1455, 1472–
74 (2017). The dissent clung tightly to the map requirement. Id at 1486–87 (Alito dis-
senting). One way of explaining the passion about this map issue is that it is a fault line 
for the motive test. On a Primary-Motive test, absence or presence of an alternative map 
is only one datum among many that may indicate the relative motives of the legislature; 
if it was easy to produce an alternative map, it will lend credence to the idea that some 
bad motive may have led it away from that map. However, the absence of such a map 
would not defeat a primary motive case because a district would be invalid (even if best 
in every other way) if offered for the wrong motives. Conversely, on a But-For standard, 
the possibility of alternative action is rather important. If the legislature’s only legal op-
tion was the district as formed, it would defeat the claim that bad motives had made any 
difference. The clash over maps is therefore a sub rosa clash over the motives standard. 
 201 515 US 900 (1995). 
 202 Id at 918. Richard Briffault, Race and Representation after Miller v. Johnson, 
1995 U Chi Legal F 23, 51, takes Miller to be a “but-for” test. 
 203 Johnson v Miller, 864 F Supp 1354, 1377 (SD Ga 1994) (emphasis added), affd, 
515 US 900 (1995). 
 204 135 S Ct 1257, 1265–66 (2015). 
 205 Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v Alabama, 989 F Supp 2d 1227, 1287, 1292, 
1293 (MD Ala 2013). “Equal opportunity harasser” cases serve as another example of 
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While it is legitimate to question how finely to slice up ac-
tions for any given inquiry,206 we should be cautious about un-
principled efforts to slice actions in such a way as to circumvent 
the results of a given motive standard. 
For one thing, this general strategy of slicing downward faces 
serious conceptual problems.207 More seriously, the handicap of 
meeting the But-For standard for only a sliver of the action may 
entail reduced remedies—in the present action and others. Im-
agine that a market manipulation plaintiff indeed bought 
1 percent more stock because of her bad motive, or a legislature 
indeed extended a legislative district by one block because of ra-
cial motives. Arguably, the defendant should provide a remedy—
the loss on the incremental stock purchase, or a redrawing of the 
key block—and no more. This is true even if bad motives were 
prevalent throughout their trading and districting. Our hunger 
for a more general remedy will go unsated if we conceive of the 
action as a series of actions, only one of which triggers the law’s 
essential conditions. 
For someone skeptical of the But-For standard, it may be a 
comfort to see that courts avail themselves of an escape valve. 
Yet it would be better to be explicit about the rule, both in order 
to assure similar rule conformity from court to court and also to 
give notice to litigating parties as a matter of legality or process. 
Therefore, it would be better to outright endorse one of the al-
ternatives that courts covertly adopt. 
 
how high granularity can convert a But-For standard into an Any-Motive standard. 
Suppose a boss tends to verbally abuse any employee in her clutches, but she customizes 
the abuse to match features of each victim. In one sense, the victim’s sex (or race, etc.) 
made no difference because the employer was sure to misbehave regardless. On the other 
hand, the particular form of the misconduct would certainly have been different but for 
the plaintiff’s protected status. 
 206 See generally Ariel Porat and Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 Yale L J 
2 (2012). See also Fennell, 59 Wm & Mary L Rev 2371 (cited in note 194). 
 207 Numerous luminaries of torts have sought a similar strategy to avoid problems 
of overdetermination there. For example, while two fires might each have galloped to-
ward the plaintiff’s house, the defendant’s fire still made a difference. The building 
wouldn’t have been destroyed “by two fires” but for the defendant’s fire; plus the defend-
ant’s fire might have burned it a little earlier (or later) than the natural fire would have 
caused. While this solution may sometimes be satisfactory, it threatens to consume as 
much as the fire it would contain. As Professor Wright points out, every feature of the 
universe was a but-for cause on some sufficiently precise description. That America is 
spelled with a single “R” is a but-for cause of “Fires destroyed your house and America is 
spelled with a single ‘R.’” Efforts to granularly define actions raise particularism prob-
lems that must be addressed, but results-oriented courts may not satisfactorily do so. 
See generally Wright, 73 Cal L Rev 1735 (cited in note 110). 
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Other tests are not as fully pliable as the But-For test be-
cause they deliver results that do not strike courts as at odds 
with the just outcome. A court that wishes to grant some remedy 
to the plaintiff—small or large—may find greater flexibility with 
an Any-Motive standard, for example. The defendant is liable on 
that standard in all mixed-motives cases, with the court able to 
subsequently condition the size and sort of remedy. 
Also, other tests are generally less responsive to the refer-
ence class and so cannot be gamed by plausibly redefining the 
granularity of the action. The Any-Motive standard, for exam-
ple, is met whenever bad motives played any role in the action. 
This test can be dodged only by defining the action so narrowly 
that the bad motive was part of some unrelated conduct. For ex-
ample, a boss who conceded to describing an employee with ra-
cial epithets prior to firing her might concede that race played a 
role in her decision-making, but just as to talking about the de-
fendant with the HR department, not as to employment deci-
sions. Then the bad motive is isolated to some discrete and 
largely separate action. This is hardly a plausible defense. 
The Primary-Motive test is likewise less sensitive to refer-
ence class adjustment. If the primary motive for a complex ac-
tion is B-Motive, there is a fair chance that the primary motive 
for any given part of it was also primarily motived by B-Motive. 
For example, if the legislature’s primary motive in drawing dis-
trict boundaries was to disenfranchise racial minorities, any 
contested boundary line is very likely motivated by that same 
impulse. To be sure, a court could zoom in on a particular dis-
trict boundary and note that this line had no illicit motive; but 
that just concentrates the troublesome motives at the lines that 
were most objectionable anyway. On a Primary-Motive test, a 
defendant who successfully lobbies a court to subdivide the ac-
tion stands to lose as much as is gained. 
B. Silence 
The But-For standard is insensitive to, and tends to sup-
press, inquiries that really ought to be encouraged. This is be-
cause the But-For standard is frequently invoked in cases in 
which the bad motive is plainly vital to the inquiry and yet al-
lows the litigation to proceed without ever examining the bad 
motive. 
The But-For standard turns only on acceptable motives. If 
acceptable motive is less than 1 (meaning it is independently 
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insufficient), any resultant action will incur liability.208 That is 
because some bad motive must have been present to establish 
sufficient motivation for the observed action; without that bad 
motive, the action would not have occurred given the low level of 
other motive. Conversely, if acceptable motive is greater than 1, 
liability is avoided regardless of the level of bad motive. Because 
the level of A-Motive ends up solely deciding the result, B-
Motive is of only derivative importance. 
This emphasis on acceptable motive relative to bad motive 
could have undesirable effects on trial practice. A defendant who 
concedes the presence of bad motives would convert the trial into 
a referendum on her acceptable motives. If these are greater 
than 1, the defendant wins and the bad motives are irrelevant. 
Regardless of who bears the burden of establishing the level of 
acceptable motive, this fixation on acceptable motives de-
emphasizes the bad motives in the adjudicatory process. 
Indeed, a court could reasonably exclude evidence bearing 
on bad motive. For example, the plaintiff in an employment dis-
crimination suit may wish to introduce invective-filled emails of 
the defendant’s rampant bias.209 With bias admitted already, 
this evidence might be excludible as not probative of any ele-
ment in dispute (and, of course, more than a little prejudicial).210 
At most, such evidence might be admissible to discredit the 
defendant’s proffered acceptable motives. Yet the point of mixed-
motive analysis is that defendants sometimes have two motives, 
neither of which is pretextual. If courts take seriously the possi-
bility of mixed motives in a given case, savvy defendants may 
deprive plaintiffs and the public of the airing of the very facts 
 
 208 See Verstein, 127 Yale L J at 1125–27 (cited in note 24). 
 209 At present, different types of discrimination get to the But-For standard through 
different initial allocations of proof. It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the 
proper use of burden shifting, though that is clearly very important to a final theory of 
motive in the law. 
 210 Whether a court would actually exclude the evidence is another question. On the 
one hand, evidence is admissible to the degree it bears on a material fact regardless of 
whether the fact is in dispute. FRE 401, Notes of the Advisory Committee ¶ 7 (“The fact 
to which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute.”). On the other hand, inflamma-
tory information that goes to prove only what is already conceded might be excludable as 
unfairly prejudicial. FRE 403. The silencing tendency of the But-For standard might also 
be expressed elsewhere, such as in courts’ widespread tendency to exclude evidence of 
“stray remarks” of discrimination. See Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 Nw U L Rev 
505, 524 (2019). 
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central to their injury. Though the law is meant to address bad 
motives, 211 the trial may not concern them. 
Showing a particularly high level of bad motive cannot help 
satisfy a But-For standard once the presence of bad motive has 
been accepted at all. Yet if we wish to have a public airing of the 
bad motives, we should use a test that invokes bad motive as an 
actual element. 
CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing Sections, I criticized reasons commonly cited 
in favor of the But-For standard in motive analysis. Causation, 
freedom, and compensation all fail to establish the viability of 
the But-For motive standard, at least relative to alternative 
standards. Each also entered the law through less than com-
mendable reasoning. 
Some may feel that these criticisms were more effective for 
some areas of law than others and that there are even domains 
in which the But-For standard remains justified. Moreover, even 
if these criticisms were successful, it does not preclude the pos-
sibility that other arguments in favor of the standard could be 
offered. Still, whatever ground was given up in the foregoing 
pages should serve to caution against a return to the But-For 
standard in any area. For many, the intuitive appeal of the But-
For standard seems immediate and plausible and does not turn 
on fine details, such as precise statutory language or the availa-
bility of liability rules as penalties. When a complex and dry 
theory is disproven in a variety of contexts, it can be right to 
save it with more complexity; when a simple and appealing the-
ory is disproven in a variety of contexts, it can be a sign that its 
appeal was illusory. 
So why is the But-For standard the presumed standard? In 
part, it reflects an inchoate recognition that several other tests 
amount to single-motive inquiries.212 And in part, this merely 
 
 211 See, for example, Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 265 (O’Connor concurring) (“There 
is no doubt that Congress considered reliance on gender or race in making employment 
decisions an evil in itself.”). 
 212 See Part III.B. The Primary-Purpose test is a true mixed-motives test, perhaps 
even more so than the But-For test because the latter can be satisfied by looking at A-
Motive alone. However, its telos is a single-motive inquiry. To ask which of two motives 
predominates is similar to asking “which, if you had to choose among these two, was the 
defendant’s motive.” We would use the same test if our goal was investigation of pretext 
(“She says she acted for motive A, but that sounds like a fig leaf given how badly she 
wanted B”). The operation of this inquiry is similar too. Courts weighing motives for 
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reflects a lack of awareness of other possible motive rules. One 
cannot disambiguate if one doesn’t know that there is ambiguity. 
Yet its core support must be discomfort with motive analysis. 
Arguments that might have slayed the whole enterprise instead 
shackled it. I predict that support for the But-For standard will 
not wane until we have achieved appropriate comfort with, or 
ended, the motive analysis enterprise. Therefore, in a future 
project, I will engage the question of why and how the law uses 
motives. 
This Article showed that other standards—the Any-Motive 
standard, the Primary-Motive standard, and others—each has 
something to offer and deserves serious consideration. Deciding 
which, if any, should replace the But-For standard in a given area 
of law requires considering what that area of law is trying to 
achieve through the use of motives. Differing mixtures of practi-
cal and normative considerations will lead to different motive 
standards in many areas, but there is reason to be optimistic 
about a principled and systematic approach filling the space left 
by the But-For standard—a coming triumph of mixed-motives 
jurisprudence. 
 
predominance try to reconcile various facts with various motives in order to test the 
competing theories that one motive or the other was the sole real motive. Thus, Primary-
Motive analysis can collapse into pretext analysis, which assumes that the defendant 
has only one motive in reality, which the court attempts to divine. See, for example, 
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 804–07 (1973). 
